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ABSTRACT 
The United States government has two main concerns in South America’s 
Andean region. The first is drug production and trafficking. This study focuses on 
the drug supply from the Andean region. The second concern is the insurgency 
conducted by Colombian narco-guerilla groups. The Colombian government is 
dedicated to defeating those illegal groups as the main cause of regional 
violence. Their primarily military strategy, implemented by local government, is 
Plan Colombia, which in the last seven years has received about five billion 
dollars in U.S. funding. Plan Colombia has geopolitical impacts on diplomacy, 
economics, national security, and the population’s well-being. Plan Colombia has 
resulted in second-order effects on the neighboring countries of Ecuador and 
Venezuela, increasing border violence, population displacement and the creation 
of refugees, environmental damage, black market weapons trading and drug 
trafficking.  
This thesis uses trust and influence theory to analyze how Plan Colombia 
affects Ecuador and Venezuela and the actions taken by these neighboring 
countries to reduce, overcome, or exacerbate negative second order effects. 
Additionally, the thesis offers suggestions on efforts Washington and Bogotá 
might make to improve and update Plan Colombia, with recommendations to 
improve U.S. regional strategies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW  
That slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war 
more seriously, but that doesn’t excuse blunting our swords in the 
name of humanity. Sooner or later someone with a sharp sword will 
come along and cut off our arms.  
Carl von Clausewitz1 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The United States government has two main concerns in South America’s 
Andean Region. The first and more deeply rooted is drug production and 
trafficking. The second concern is insurgency, conducted by Colombian “terrorist 
groups” such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the 
National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC).2 The U.S. is the current hegemonic world power and exerts influence in 
Latin American political, economic, and military issues. Two common means of 
influence are through free-trade agreements and counter-drug operations in the 
countries of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia.3 
Despite efforts against drugs and narco-guerilla groups, the U.S. 
Department of Justice reports that cocaine continues to be "widely available" in 
the U.S. and that “efforts to combat drugs at the source have only managed to 
shift coca to new regions and back to old ones.”4 The Andean Counter-drug 
Initiative (ACI), begun in 1989, decreased drug activity in Bolivia and Peru, but 
                                            
1 Cited by Charles M. Westenhoff in, Military Airpower, A Revised Digest of Airpower Opinions and 
Thoughts, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 2007, available from 
http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Westenhoff%201/Westenhoff%201.pdf, (accessed February 25, 2008), 62. 
2 U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations," (Office of Counterterrorism, Washington 
D.C., October, 2001), available from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/5258.htm, (accessed August 
23, 2007).  
3 U.S. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report," The 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2007. 
4 U.S. Department of State, “State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 1996-
2005,” available from http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/, (accessed August 25, 2007). 
 2
increased it in Ecuador and Colombia, where guerillas became involved in drug 
trafficking. One outcome of ACI was the movement of crops and laboratories to 
nearby countries. In 2000, the U.S. began funding Plan Colombia, intended as a 
coordinated and integrated strategy against illegal groups profiting from drug 
revenues.5 
The Colombians’ internal conflict has been ongoing for six decades; it is 
the longest and most violent in the Andean Ridge, hampering Colombia's 
development and affecting its regional relationships. Violence in Colombia affects 
neighboring countries. The Colombian government today focuses on defeating 
drug traffickers and insurgents by eliminating the coca crops and cocaine 
production that are the main instigators of regional violence.6 Plan Colombia, the 
primarily military strategy implemented by local government, has geopolitical 
effects on diplomacy, the economy, national security and the population’s well-
being.7 Funded with about five billion dollars over the last seven years by the 
U.S., Plan Colombia causes unintended negative second-order effects in 
neighboring countries such as increased border violence, displaced populations 
and refugees, environmental damage, weapons trading in black markets and 
drug trafficking. According to Ecuadorian officials, Colombia has made no effort 
to minimize these negative second-order effects.8 
The drug market has two sides: supply and demand. To solve the 
consumption problem, it is also necessary to deal with the demand side, which is 
a matter for U.S. domestic anti-drug policy. This study focuses on the supply side 
in the Andean region to determine how Plan Colombia affects neighboring 
countries, particularly Ecuador and Venezuela. 
                                            
5 Garry Leech, “Plan Colombia: A Closer Look,” July 2000, the Information Network of the Americas 
(INOTA), available from http://www.colombiajournal.org/plancolombia.htm, (accessed August 18, 2007). 
6 Ricardo Meza, “Biowarfare in Colombia: A controversial fumigation scheme,” NACLA Report on the 
America, 2000, 21. 
7 State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 1996-2005. 
8 Crisis Group, “Ecuador: Overcoming Instability?," (Latin American Report No. 22, August 2007), 
available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4976, (accessed August 25, 2007), 13. 
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B. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS  
This thesis argues that Plan Colombia is a shortsighted policy initiative 
that focuses solely on Colombia and has failed to consider the entire Andean 
region, which faces a transnational threat. Few if any regional dynamics were 
considered in the Plan Colombia policy. Unanswered concerns include Plan 
Colombia’s effects on neighboring countries and the actions and subsequent 
reactions from affected neighbors, Washington, and Bogotá. Other concerns 
include cultural factors that influence U.S. policy and implementation, the Andean 
external dynamics impacting the plan, and the question of political support from 
Andean nations. A more cohesive interagency and inter-state approach during 
the development of the Plan Colombia policy may have offered mitigating 
solutions to these problems from the start.9 
The study examines the hypothesis that Plan Colombia has caused 
unintended negative consequences in neighboring countries due to a poor 
understanding of regional relationships. Focusing on Ecuador and Venezuela, 
the thesis uses trust and influence theories to analyze the main interests, 
perceptions, and misperceptions of affected countries and local populations. As it 
currently stands, Plan Colombia seems likely to initiate social resistance to 
American influence in the region, with specific positive and negative impacts 
likely in Ecuador and Venezuela. 
The thesis examines the supply side of the drug trade, with a viewpoint 
that will not necessarily support the approach taken by policymakers and 
analysts in Washington and Bogotá over the past few years. Literature related to 
illicit drugs in the Andean Ridge includes a wide variety of material based on 
authors’ particular interests and political perceptions. The literature appears  
 
 
                                            
9 Jeffrey Johnson, A.K. Williams, Johnny Weidmann and Celso Andrade, “Plan Colombia as 
Interagency Road Map," Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007, 15. 
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incomplete because it does not include enough information on all Andean actors 
dealing with drug trafficking as a transnational threat and largely ignores Plan 
Colombia’s second order effects that neighboring countries are undergoing. 
Ecuador is a crucial element of U.S. anti-drug efforts in the region. 
Ecuador hosts one of the U.S. Southern Command's Cooperative Security 
Location/ Forward Operating Locations (CSL/FOL) in Manta. This CLS/FOL, 
established in 1999, provides aerial coverage on the eastern Pacific, which has 
been identified as an important drug-transiting route on the Andean Ridge.10 
According to Congressional testimony, up to 2005, the Manta CSL/FOL has 
provided information leading to the seizure of $3.4 billion worth of cocaine.11 
Venezuela is also important for anti-drug efforts and the battle against Colombian 
narco-guerilla groups. These groups, which are Plan Colombia’s target, use 
Venezuelan territory to rest, transit drugs and arms, and procure logistical 
supplies. Since 2001, when the U.S. Military Liaison Group was expelled from 
local military headquarters and relocated to the U.S. Embassy compound, the 
American military has had only limited contact with the Venezuelan military.12 
This situation impedes efforts to improve the continually degrading U.S.- 
Venezuela relationship. 
Success in dealing with the long term and complex drug trafficking conflict 
requires that U.S. and Colombian decision makers devise a strategy that 
recognizes previous efforts such as the 1989 Andean Counter-Drug Initiative 
(ACI), as well as lessons learned from Plan Colombia’s seven year history. The 
thesis argues that the U.S. should consider expanding the parameters of Plan 
                                            
10 U.S. Department of State, “Western Hemispheric Region, Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to 
Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006," (The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, September 2006), available 
from http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74687.htm, (accessed May 15, 2007). 
11 See General Bantz J. Craddock, “The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) works to combat 
terrorism and strengthen stability in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Testimony before The 109th 
Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, March, 2005, available from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/Mar/16-51355.html (accessed August 6, 2007). 
12 Douglas Farah, “A Tutor to Every Army in Latin America, U.S. Expands Latin American Training 
Role," (Washington Post Foreign Service Monday, July 13, 1998), A01. 
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Colombia to include Ecuador and Venezuela in order to ensure that gains within 
Colombia are not undermined by negative actions in the two neighboring 
countries. If the U.S. does not build a regional political alliance against drugs with 
other Andean nations, it may see a reverse “domino effect,” in which drugs and 
associated narco-guerillas take advantage of inconsistent legal retaliation simply 
by moving from country to country.13 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis research uses trust and influence theory, treating Plan 
Colombia as a case study for analysis. The research is based on a chronological 
database of the countries involved in the Plan Colombia military strategy: 
Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and the U.S. Relevant political, social and military 
events and data are identified through a review of the literature, as well as 
interviews and correspondence with policymakers, analysts, academic experts, 
military commanders, military attachés, journalists, and informed members of civil 
society from the U.S. and Andean Ridge.14 
The investigation follows these steps. 1) Literature review on the 
Washington-Bogotá axis, focused on U.S. political, economic, and military 
influence in the Andean Ridge, Plan Colombia, and its effects on Ecuador and 
Venezuela. 2) Development of a chronological database beginning in 1989 with 
the ACI. 3) Interviews and correspondence with individuals knowledgeable about 
the region. 4) Discussion and analysis of the data through lessons learned. 5) 
Recommendations. 
The study’s intended audience includes faculty members at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, U.S. and Colombian policy-advisors, Latin American 
analysts, and Ecuadorian civilian and military officials. 
                                            
13 Johnson et al., 2007. 
14 Inter American Dialogue, “Crisis and Opportunity in the Andean region, The Cases of Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela," available from http://www.thedialogue.org/programs/country/andean_exec.asp 
(accessed August 21, 2007). 
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D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I introduces U.S. policy in the 
Andean region, describes the main objectives and gives an overview of the 
thesis and a description of the methodology used in this study. 
Chapter II provides a general explanation of the trust and influence 
theories that support this study, along with background on the American counter-
drug strategies in the Andean Ridge beginning with the failed 1989 ACI. The ACI 
has since been augmented with the Plan Colombia strategy to undermine the 
drug cartels and narco-guerillas who supply U.S. markets. 
Chapter III presents the history of Plan Colombia and the joint strategy of 
the U.S. and Colombian governments (what analysts call the "Washington-
Bogota axis"). The chapter includes an overview of the main components of the 
plan and the distribution of funds between soft and hard approaches. 
Chapter IV focuses on how Plan Colombia affects Ecuador and 
Venezuela. These countries have different expectations. Ecuador supports 
regional counter-drug efforts through the CSL/FOL located in Manta, but is 
experiencing several of Plan Colombia’s negative second order effects. 
Venezuela's current President, Hugo Chavez, is among the most significant U.S. 
antagonists. Chavez has expressed some sympathy for the Colombian narco-
guerilla groups. 
Chapter V highlights some of Plan Colombia’s lessons learned for 
designing, adjusting, and improving U.S. foreign counter-drug policy and 
strategy. 
Chapter VI analyses the data collected from the fieldwork, reviews the 
hypothesis, and, while recognizing that there is no quick solution for the long-
standing drug problem, broadly proposes a regional roadmap by prioritizing soft 
approach tools with special attention to inter-state relations and presents 
conclusions and recommendations to improve future counter-drug efforts. 
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II. TRUST, INFLUENCE, AND THE ANDEAN COUNTER DRUG 
INITIATIVE  
Without some sense of historical continuity, Americans are likely to 
relearn the lessons of history each time they are faced with a low-
intensity conflict. But what is more dangerous is the fact that during 
the relearning process Americans may suffer casualties and 
develop policy directions that can only lead to defeat. 
Sam C. Sarkesian, 198415 
A. TRUST AND INFLUENCE 
The study uses trust and influence theories to understand how local, state 
and non-state actors perceive the U.S. presence in the Andean Ridge. This 
section provides an overview of relevant concepts from these theories.16 
Influence is a crucial concept. In 1959, John R. French and Bertram 
Raven, the authors of Bases of Social Power, state that social power and social 
influence are found in psychology, sociology, and political science. They claim 
that “the phenomena of power and influence involve a dyadic relation between 
two agents which may be viewed from two points of view: (a) What determines 
the behavior of the agent who exerts power? (b) What determines the reactions 
of the recipient of this behavior?”17 Both authors argue that in a particular power 
relationship, there are variables that define it and consequently it is not limited to 
any specific source. French and Raven’s idea of social influence and power is 
that “social influence and power is limited to influence on the person, P, produced 
by a social agent, O, where O can be either another person, a role, a norm, a 
                                            
15 Sam C. Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the 
Future (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 245. 
16 Colin Williams and Celso Andrade, “Plan Colombia: U.S. Trust and Influence in the Andean Ridge," 
Naval Postgraduate School, September 12, 2007. 
17 French, John R. P. and Bertram Raven, Bases of Social Power, ed. Dorwin Cartwright (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan, 1959), 150. 
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part of a group. We do not consider social influence exerted on a group.”18 These 
authors analyzed the basis that underline the relationship between power (O) 
and person (P) focusing on those elements that explain why P complies with O’s 
commands.19 Thus, social power is the amount of powers that O is capable of 
because of some more or less enduring relation to P.  
In Managing with Power, Jeffrey Pfeffer defines power as “the potential 
ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome 
resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do.”20 He 
explains that “[p]olitics and influence are the processes, the actions, the 
behaviors through which this potential power is utilized and realized.”21 Power, 
an essential component of strong leadership, is a tool to be seized and wielded 
by leaders to achieve their goals once they understand the combination of 
techniques, strategies, tactics, and dynamics that underlie its effective use. 
Pfeffer affirms that success is measured by results and “morality is rarely 
relevant.”22 To survive and be successful, people have to play the “political 
game” and be part of the organizational system.  
Pfeffer develops his own “golden rule’: the person with the gold makes the 
rules and decision. “Being in the right place - a power position - may be the most 
important factor. Power positions provide control over resources such as budgets 
and physical facilities, control over access to information, and formal authority.”23 
Various kind of resources, including allies, are vitally important as sources of 
                                            
18 French and Raven, 151. 
19 Elega Jiménez Sandoval, “Understanding Modern Charismatic Leadership: Hugo Chávez and the 
'Peaceful Revolution' in Contemporary Venezuelan Politics,” Waseda University, Graduate School of Asia 
Pacific Studies, Ph. D. Dissertation, September 2005, 44. 
20 Jeffrey Pfeffer, Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations, (Harvard Business 
School Press, 1994), 30. 
21 Pfeffer, 30. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Cited by John W. Hodge in “Managing with Power, Politics and Influence in Organizations: Book 
Reviews,” HR Magazine, October 1992, available from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3495/is_n10_v37/ai_13574906, (accessed January 12, 2008). 
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power. “Find others with common interests and build long-term relationships with 
them. Failures in implementation are almost always failures in building 
coalitions.”24 He also states that “to influence others, it is clearly useful to be able 
to understand them, their interests and attitudes, and how to reach them.”25 
Pfeffer divides power into seven types, based on the relationships between the 
actors: 1) reward power; 2) coercive power; 3) legitimate power; 4) expert power; 
5) information power; 6) referent power; and, 7) network power.26  
1. Reward Power  
This refers to the degree to which the individual can give others a reward 
of some kind such as a positive stroke, some form of compensation, awards, or 
any symbolic gesture that is seen as a compliment. It depends on power’s ability 
to manipulate positive rewards; its magnitude depends on one's perception of the 
meaning of the behavior.27 
2. Coercive Power 
Coercive power deals with people’s expectations. People will be punished 
by power if they do not comply with power’s attempts to exercise its will.28 It 
might refer to verbal and nonverbal put-downs, slights, symbolic gestures of 
disdain, or actual psychological or physical attack. While reward power increases 
people’s attraction towards power, coercive power builds resentment and 
resistance by decreasing the attraction felt by people towards power. French and  
 
 
                                            
24 Pfeffer, 69. 
25 Ibid., 172. 
26 Ibid., 69-77. 
27 Business Horizons, “Chapter 9. The effective use of power,” chapter rewrite, May/June 1986, 
Foundation for the School of Business at Indiana University, available from 
http://python.rice.edu/~arb/Courses/610_06_hew_9.pdf, (accessed January 12, 2008), 2. 
28 Jimenez Sandoval, 45. 
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Raven state that “the strength of coercive power depends on the magnitude of 
the negative valence of the threatened punishment and the perceived probability 
that person can avoid the punishment by conformity.”29 
3. Legitimate power 
It is formal authority delegated to the holder of the position. The power 
relationship originated when people believe that power has a legitimate right to 
influence their behavior, therefore, feel obligation to accept power’s influence. 
“Those values range from culturally learned patterns to acceptance of authority 
as prescribed in a specific system of hierarchy within a given social structure.”30 
4. Expert Power 
It is an individual's power deriving from knowledge and expertise in a 
given area as attributed by people. The evaluation made is usually highly specific 
and limited to the particular area based upon people’s knowledge or on some 
more general standards. The way expert power is delivered is critical in forming 
the perceptions of the recipient because it can be seen as an unwanted intrusion 
in any particular issue and can affect their reciprocal trust.31 
5. Information Power 
This kind of power depends upon access to information that is not public 
knowledge. Individuals with this type of power are well informed, up-to-date, and 
have confidence in debating and the ability to persuade others. “Information, 
along with a sensitivity to its importance, is key to sensible decision making.”32  
 
                                            
29 French and Raven, 157. 
30 Jimenez Sandoval, 45. 
31 Cited by Juan Pablo Davila in "Analyzing Managing with Power," les fiches de lecture de la Chaire 
D.S.O., 2001, available from http://www.cnam.fr/lipsor/dso/articles/fiche/pfeffer.html, (accessed August 23, 
2007). 
32 Pfeffer, 39. 
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Information is used to exercise and consolidate power in organizations “by 
placing your self or your allies in a position to exercise more control over 
resources and information.”33  
6. Referent Power  
Referent power is the identification of people with power. It deals with the 
charisma and interpersonal skills of the power holder. Good leaders – as power 
holders - have the ability to attract others and build loyal links. Control over 
information and resources is an important source of power where followers have 
particular interests – material or psychological needs – that expand their desire to 
become or to remain associated with the leader.34 Nationalism and patriotism are 
also in this category. It is important to highlight that leaders can be good or bad, 
depending on what parameters (principles as well as cultural values) are used to 
assess them.  
7. Network Power 
Pfeffer states that location in a communication network and measuring 
individual’s information power describes the type of influence that one can exert 
over people. Network power can improve one's interdependence based on 
individual knowledge and physical location in any network. Working to achieve 
network centrality is particularly important and a powerful resource for people or 
groups who would otherwise have little power.35 The effects of such choices on 
communication centrality, and consequently, on power and influence need to be 
considered. Knowledge is power, and “one's access to knowledge depends on 
their location in the communication network.”36 
                                            
33 Davila. 
34 Pfeffer, 77-78. 
35 Ibid., 111-112. 
36 Davila.  
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The U.S. can have a relationship with its Andean partners characterized 
by one or more of the aforementioned power relationships. The U.S. can 
certainly use the “carrot” to get Andean countries to do something, demonstrating 
a reward relationship. However, if reward is not enough to motivate those 
countries to comply with U.S. wishes, the U.S. might pressure them with the 
“stick,” or coercion. Context, desired behavior, and level of resistance are 
significant factors in deciding the power relationship to be applied. 
Of the seven possible power relationships between actors, only two can 
function without trust: coercive and referent. The other relationships require some 
degree of trust. The concept of trust used in this study is simply that the truster 
trusts the trusted to do something (expectations) when certain conditions exist. 
For example, as will be seen in later discussion, the U.S. trusts Colombia to 
propagate anti-drug rhetoric (expectations) when the U.S. pays to build and staff 
a radio station (conditions). In this example, the expectations and conditions 
demonstrate influence based on a relationship of reward, indicated by the 
construction and staffing of a radio station.37 
A leading author on trust, Piotr Sztompka, defines trust as “a bet on the 
future actions of others.”38 It is important to understand trust between two parties 
because this concept may help explain the nature of the power relationship. 
Sztompka offers a synthetic treatment of trust as a cultural resource necessary 
for viable functioning of society. The importance of trust derives from some 
fundamental qualities of human action. When interacting with others, people 
must constantly articulate expectations about their future actions. People behave 
according to their anticipation of how other people will act, committing 
themselves to actions with at least partly uncertain and unpredictable 
consequences.39  
                                            
37 Williams and Andrade, 7. 
38 Piotr Sztompka, Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 25. 
39 Sztompka, 20. 
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Sztompka suggests that trust has become an increasingly salient issue 
because individuals are actively required to face an ever more complex and 
uncertain world.40 He stresses that trust is “intimately related to risk”41 and 
makes a useful distinction between primary and secondary targets of trust.42 
Primary and secondary targets can be individuals as well as roles, groups, 
organizations, institutions, systems, or societies; however, trust always relates to 
persons, so that the logic of primordial, personal, trust is behind all types of 
trust.43 Sztompka explains that congruence between expectations and roles is a 
crucial element in the placement of trust. Thus, the discussion again moves 
swiftly into the area of controlling or reducing the risk of misplaced trust. Above 
all, the decision to trust rests on an evaluation of the relationship with potential 
trustees. The rational calculation is modified, according to Sztompka, by the 
truster's psychological “trusting impulse” and cultural “rules of trust.”44 
Senior decision makers’ main objective should be to earn the Colombian 
trust and confidence and to convince peasants that their personal and national 
interests resided with the government efforts, not with the insurgents. “There is a 
direct correlation between credibility and the ability to demonstrably improve the 
quality of life, physical security, and stability in a society.”45 This notion implies 
that an information operations plan has to be developed and closely monitored 
by the IO specialists. Trust and influence have to be well maintained by 
developing a structure and mechanisms to systematically synchronize the IO 
throughout different institutions. U.S. agencies must increase, as fast as 
possible, their understanding of local culture in order to be culturally sensitive.46 
                                            
40 Sztompka, 11. 
41 Ibid., 29. 
42 Ibid., 46. 
43 Ibid., 41. 
44 Ibid., 52-56. 
45 Ralph O. Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat team Commander’s Perspective on 
Information Operations," Military Review, May-June 2006, 9. 
46 Baker, 20 -21.  
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Trust and influence can be lost because of a lack of coordination and 
synchronization and by disseminating contradictory information. Sztompka also 
states that individuals and societies only benefit from trust, if it is neither 
misplaced nor used for unethical purposes. Trust and influence serve 
organizations because it makes it possible for them to reach their goals. It is 
important to highlight that cultural misperception could lead to a failure in the 
entire mission. Thus, reliable actions supported by targeted communications to 
specific audiences lead to success. Planners must always keep in mind that 
government institutions are competing for influence with counter-government 
groups and therefore require that an effective IO plan be developed along with a 
maneuver plan.47 Therefore, the ability of a state to generate interpersonal trust 
may rest largely on the trustworthiness of the state itself, which means that 
decision-making, policies, and implementation procedures are considered fair, 
transparent, and non-discriminatory; hence, the polity will feel sheltered and will 
attempt to be more cooperative.48 
B. THE ANDEAN COUNTER DRUG INITIATIVE 
In the last three decades, illegal drug use in the U.S. has become an issue 
of health, criminal justice, and foreign policy. Fighting drug use in U.S. society 
has most frequently involved punitive strategies. The U.S. has one of the world's 
highest rates of incarceration for illegal drug use.49 Internationally, drug policy 
has become a cornerstone of the U.S. relationship with other countries. The “War 
on Drugs” began in 1988 when President Ronald Reagan created the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy for central coordination of drug-related legislative, 
                                            
47 Sztompka, 69-74. 
48 Margaret Levi, “The State of the Study of the State,” Department of Political Science, University of 
Washington, December 2000, edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, available from 
http://www.yale.edu/leitner/pdf/levi.doc, (accessed August 17, 2007). 
49 Dave Bewley-Taylor, Mike Trace and Alex Stevens, "Incarceration of drug offenders: costs and 
impacts," The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Program, 2005, available from 
http://www.internationaldrugpolicy.net/reports/BeckleyFoundation_BriefingPaper_07.pdf, (accessed 
November 9, 2007), 3. 
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security, diplomatic, research and health policy throughout the government. 
Since then, over $25 billion has been spent annually on controlling drugs 
internationally, making this war one of the largest annual recipients of U.S. 
government overseas funding.50 In the 1990s, Washington averaged $57.7 billion 
annually on "law enforcement, interdiction, educational, rehabilitation, and health-
related programs designed to stem the flow of heroin and cocaine and manage 
their effects.”51 
In 1989, the first Bush administration began providing an average of $700 
million annually to the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative. The ACI's initial purpose 
was to reduce the impact of the illegal drug trade in America by reducing illicit 
drug crop cultivation and trafficking.52 Beginning in 1989 with the Counter-drug 
Initiative, U.S. interagency funds, support and personnel have played a leading 
role in anti-drug operations in the Andean Ridge. The purpose of the ACI is to 
reduce “illicit drug crop cultivation and trafficking through a combination of 
intense and consistent eradication, interdiction, organization attack, and 
alternative development in key source and transit countries to reduce the impact 
of the illegal drug trade in the hemisphere.”53 Since 1989, the U.S. military has 
played a strong role in the drug war. The National Defense Authorization Act 




                                            
50 Linda Farthing, “The Drug War in the Andes," Ithaca, New York, March 2006, available from 
http://ain-bolivia.org/drugwarCompleteLF.doc, (accessed September 16, 2007). 
51 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability, (RAND, 2001), 19. 
52 “The Andean Counter-drug Initiative Assessment," Office of the President of the United States, 
available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/summary/10002210.2004.html, (accessed 
September 16, 2007). 
53 Ibid. 
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drugs entering the U.S.54 Most military aid and training for foreign countries in 
past years has come from funds designated for Drug War programs, including 
the ACI and Plan Colombia. 
In 1997, the Clinton administration passed a Presidential Directive (PDD) 
and National Security Decision Directive (NSPD) to increase awareness that 
“effective responses to [drug trafficking] may require multi-dimensional 
operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, 
intelligence, economic development, and security: hence the term complex 
contingency operations.”55 In 1999, Clinton agreed to support the new 
Colombian government’s strategy against the drug industry, Plan Colombia, by 
funding it with $1.3 billion. However, by 2002, the second Bush administration 
assessed that U.S. decision makers “have to develop an active strategy to help 
the Andean nations adjust their economies, enforce their laws, defeat terrorist 
organizations, and cut off the supply of drugs.”56 In essence, the desired 
outcomes of Plan Colombia have not been achieved. 
The data on U.S. funding of Andean anti-drug efforts between 2000 and 
2007 shows big differences between what Colombia receives (75 percent of the 
total) and what other Andean countries receive. Ecuador receives 2.5 percent 




                                            
54 Glen Segell, “The Narcotics War and Civil-Military Relations," International Studies Association  
41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA, March 2000, available from http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/seg03/, 
(accessed October 21, 2007). 
55 William J. Clinton, “Presidential Decision Directive," Federation of American Scientists, 1997, 
available from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm, (accessed July 20, 2007). 
56 The Office of the President of the United States, “The National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America, 2002," available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss4.html, (accessed July 20, 2007). 
57 At this point, second order effects are not qualified as positive or negative because Ecuador and 
Venezuela, as sovereign states, have different approaches and perceptions. 
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U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Andean Countries ($7144.59) 
 FY2000 – FY2007  
 (in millions $)  
FY Colombia Peru Bolivia Ecuador Venezuela 
2000 1124.50 80.50 158.50 21.70 4.60 
2001 239.20 48.50 52.70 2.80 1.60 
2002 525.20 143.00 90.30 25.60 5.50 
2003 766.80 129.70 93.50 32.50 2.80 
2004 706.30 116.00 95.60 35.00 5.00 
2005 767.80 115.40 90.30 25.80 2.98 
2006 682.95 106.92 79.20 19.80 2.23 
2007 556.07 103.24 66.08 17.38 1.04 
Sub Total 5368.82 843.26 726.18 180.58 25.75 
% 75.15% 11.80% 10.16% 2.53% 0.36% 
Table 1.   U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Andean Countries 2000-200758 
 
Figure 1.   U.S. Counter Narcotics Assistance to Andean Countries 2000-200759 
                                            
58 Connie Veillette, “Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2007 
Assistance," Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, CRS Report for Congress, Based on data from 
the U.S. State Department and USAID Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2002-2007, P.L. 110-5, 
August 30, 2007, available from http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8778:1, 
(accessed September 16, 2007), 7-12. 
59 Veillette, 7-12. 
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Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, for example, have not received 
U.S. funding for military training and education because these countries, as part 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), did not sign the 
Article 98 agreement in accordance with the American Service Members' 
Protection Act (ASPA). The Article 98 provision excludes U.S. service members 
from prosecution under the ICC. Because Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela 
have not signed, U.S. decision makers have withheld funds from the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) program to punish them. The decision to 
withhold funding was made despite the fact that it may produce, in the words of 
U.S. General Banz J. Craddock, “negative effects on long-term U.S. security 
interests in the Western Hemisphere and unintended consequence of restricting 
U.S. access to and interaction with many important partner nations.”60 Perhaps 
only coincidentally, most democratic and American-allied countries in the region 
are governed by leftist politicians who sometimes oppose Washington’s regional 
policies and strategies. A similar political consequence may follow from the 
Andean Counter-drug Initiative and its complementary strategy, Plan Colombia. 
During the 1990’s, successful drug crop eradication in Bolivia and Peru led 
to a huge expansion of coca leaf production and opium poppy cultivation in 
Colombia. The shifts in the location of coca cultivation meant that overall 
production in the Andean region has remained constant since the beginning of 
the 1990’s.61 (See Figure 2) At the same time, guerilla groups active in coca 




                                            
60 Craddock, “The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) works to combat terrorism and strengthen 
stability in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Testimony before the 109th Congress Senate Armed Services 
Committee, March 2005, available from http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/Mar/16-51355.html, 
(accessed August 6, 2007). 
61 U.S. State Department, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 1996-2005," available from 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/, (accessed September 16, 2007). 
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activities with drug industry income, and these groups grew rapidly with the 
increased income. Official Colombian sources estimate that about half of guerilla 
groups’ income comes from the drug trade.62 
 
Figure 2.   U.S. Government Estimate of Andean Coca Cultivation63 
According to the State Department International Narcotics Strategy 
Report, “[S]ince 1989 the coca cultivation in the region has declined a mere 16 
percent, as relatively large reductions in production in Peru and Bolivia have 
been paralleled by increased cultivation in Colombia.”64 In April 2001, Bush 
announced a new Andean Counter-drug Initiative. The new program increases  
 
                                            
62 Roger F. Noriega, “U.S. Policy and Programs in Colombia," Testimony Before the House of 
Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Bureau Of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, 
D.C., June 2004, available from http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/040617nori.htm, (accessed August 20, 
2007). 
63 U.S. State Department, “Foreign Military Financing, 2005-2007," 2007. 
64 The Free Library, Andean Regional Initiative: A Policy Fated to Fail, Volume 6, Number 29, July 
2001, available from 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Andean+Regional+Initiative%3a+A+Policy+Fated+to+Fail.-a077806344, 
(accessed September 12, 2007). 
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the involvement of the U.S. military in the region.65 This new initiative takes the 
same approach as the 1989 Initiative, prioritizing military hardware and training 
for the Andean military and police forces to combat drugs. 
Figure 3 suggests that the new ACI, like the original plan, is unlikely to 
have a substantial impact on the production and trafficking of drugs. 
 
 
Figure 3.   ACI’s utcome, Andean cultivation 1990-200666 
As Edward J. Rougemont notes, “[T]he production of drugs in the region 
has remained constant and the flow of drugs to U.S. markets has continued.”67 In 
addition, U.S. support for relatively unsuccessful eradication programs angers 
rural communities and presents threats to human health and the environment.68 
Several members of the U.S. House of Representatives agreed in 2005 that the 
                                            
65 Farthing, 36. 
66 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2007, available from 
www.unodc.org., http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf, (accessed September 16, 
2007), 13. 
67 Edward J. Rougemont, Drug Legalization and the Impact of Drugs on Hemispheric Security, (Inter-
American Defense College Department Of Studies, Class XLII, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 
April 2003), 28. 
68 Mario Murillo and Jesus Rey Avirama, Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and 
Destabilization, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003, 129-130. 
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ACI “has failed as an anti-drug policy, it has failed as a human rights policy, and 
it has failed to have any impact at all in reducing the availability, price or purity of 
drugs in the streets of America.”69 Representatives noted in 2005 that “illegal 
drugs are cheaper today than they were six years ago and $4 billion ago.” (See 
Figure 4) A 2001 Rand Corporation study, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of 
Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability predicts that 
“every dollar the U.S. spent trying to wipe out coca in remote areas of Colombia 
would be 23 times more effective, if the U.S. spent it at home on drug treatment, 




Figure 4.   U.S. Overseas Drug Control Spending vs. Cocaine and Heroin 
Prices71 
                                            
69 Colombia Debate in the House of Representatives, "The McGovern-McCollum-Moore amendment to 
the foreign operations appropriations bill proposed to cut military spending to Colombia by $100 million," 
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71 “Below the Radar: U.S. Military Programs with Latin America, 1997-2007," Latin America Working 
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The nature of counter drug programs in the Andean region is important for 
understanding the lack of long-term results. U.S. counter drug programs - ACI 
and Plan Colombia - in Colombia involve two major, and controversial, 
procedures. The first is eradication through herbicide spraying, which destroys 
legitimate crops and the environment along with coca, and has met resistance by 
local state governments and peasants. The second is interdiction through 
investment of billions of dollars for military hardware and training for Colombian 
security forces sometimes linked to human rights violations.72 
The global cocaine market is basically stable in terms of both supply and 
demand. Figures presented above indicate that the supply side of the market is 
adaptive. The success in the reduction of coca cultivation from 2000 to 2006 did 
not lead to a notable decline in cocaine production, as shown in the 2007 United 
Nations World Drug Report: 1,008 metric tons in 2004, 980 in 2005, and 984 in 
2006. With stable production, interdiction efforts have not met planners' 
expectations.73 The White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) estimated that “cocaine’s street price in the U.S. was about 20 percent 
lower in July 2006 than it had been in July 2003.”74 Moreover, in early 2007, the 
Latin American Working Group reported that “despite the large and growing 
outlays for crop eradication and drug interdiction operations, cocaine and heroin 
prices have continued to fall, and remain at near their all-time lows.”75 
This thesis argues that the U.S. should refocus its resources, in order to 
“[avoid] short term victory with no lasting effect.” A two-pronged approach would 
link the supply side in the Andean Ridge (offering strong support for enforcement 
and alternative development programs and democratic institutions) and the 
                                            
72 Farthing, 2006, 74. 
73 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2007, (United Nations 
Publication), available from www.unodc.org., http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf, 
(accessed September 16, 2007), 12. 
74 John P. Walters, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Report on Progress in Colombia: 
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demand side (with a comprehensive anti-drug strategy of prevention education 
and rehabilitation in the U.S.).76 As the RAND Corporation study notes, victory in 
the war against drugs requires a unified and multilateral effort in the Western 
hemisphere, one based on mutual trust.77 
                                            
76 “Andean Counterdrug Initiative,” reprint of the speech presented to the U.S. Senate Caucus on 
International Narcotics Control, Washington, D.C., September 17, 2002, available from 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Andean+Counterdrug+Initiative.-a098543780, (accessed September 12, 
2007). 
77 Rabasa and Chalk, 79-82. 
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III. PLAN COLOMBIA, THE WASHINGTON-BOGOTÁ AXIS 
Forces that cannot win will not deter. 
Gen Nathan F. Twining78 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Colombia is Latin America’s oldest formal democracy and a major U.S. 
partner in the fight against international narcotics trafficking and terrorism. With a 
territory about the same size as Texas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, Colombia 
supplies more than 80 percent of the cocaine and nearly 70 percent of the heroin 
in the U.S.79 
Plan Colombia, proposed in 1999, is the ACI program devoted to 
Colombia. To implement the $7.5 billion program, Colombia asked for $3.5 billion 
from the international community to supplement $4 billion of its own resources. At 
first, President Clinton funded the plan with a $1.3 billion U.S. interagency 
assistance package aimed at “curbing violence in Colombia and drug abuse in 
the U.S.”80 Eighty percent of the assistance package went for "hard-side" military 
issues, such as counter-narcotics and counterterrorism, and the remaining 20 
percent to complementary “soft-side” matters like fostering peace, strengthening 
democracy and social institutions, judicial reform, alternative development, 
refugee assistance and human rights. 
Considered within the framework of trust and influence, the U.S. 
government trusted that Plan Colombia would reduce the availability of narcotics  
 
                                            
78 Cited by Charles M. Westenhoff in, Military Airpower, A Revised Digest of Airpower Opinions and 
Thoughts, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 2007, available from 
http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Westenhoff%201/Westenhoff%201.pdf, (accessed February 25, 2008), 83. 
79 Tina Rosenberg, “The Great Cocaine Quagmire: Can Bush Resist Expanding Clinton’s Colombian 
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in U.S. markets when the government implemented support for the plan. The 
influence of the U.S. in the region increased. After the Congress authorized 
expanded support for Colombia’s fight against drugs, narcotics trafficking and 
terrorist organizations, the American Embassy in Colombia became one of the 
world's largest diplomatic missions.81 The embassy symbolizes wealth, power 
and U.S. influence. 
The main effort of Plan Colombia was only a temporary success story; 
however, large amounts of coca were eradicated in the early years of the 
program and trafficking routes were successfully interdicted. Arrests and 
extraditions of drug traffickers dramatically increased. There was an increase in 
the street price of cocaine and a decrease in the purity of the product, so 
effectively drug distribution was curtailed. Successes were primarily due to men 
and women on the ground destroying crops, interdicting smuggling routes, and 
making arrests. However, after 2002 drug traffickers came up with different and 
creative shipment options and the cocaine trend in the U.S. market once again 
tended to “stabilize” by itself.82 (See Figure 4)  
Concepts of trust and influence help explain why Plan Colombia's success 
was only temporary. The U.S. influenced the Colombian government to address 
the issue of drugs that come to the United States. Pfeffer’s framework fits 
because the Colombian people resisted the request for local support, as U.S. 
drug use was not a problem for the Colombian people. The U.S. subsequently 
influenced the Colombian government to deal with an issue the peasants in the 
countryside would rather not address. However, participants in Plan Colombia 
could not sustain their actions because their expectations went unmet. Farmers 
trusted Plan Colombia to provide them with alternate crops when they eradicated 
the coca. The farmers further trusted the Colombian government to satisfy basic 
needs and protect them from the drug cartels when the farmers supported Plan 
                                            
81 Peter Clark, “Failed ‘Plan’ in Colombia," (July 31, 2000), available from 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030818/clark, (accessed May 16, 2007). 
82 “Below the Radar," 6. 
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Colombia. Unfortunately, Plan Colombia, the U.S., and the Colombian 
government could not meet the farmers’ expectations. Suffering from their lack of 
money, most farmers returned to coca farming. 
B. MAIN COMPONENTS OF PLAN COLOMBIA 
Table 2 presents the five main components of U.S. Interagency 
Assistance for Plan Colombia and appropriations for FY 2000. 
Program Appropriation 
(in millions of 
dollars) 





$122.0 Support for Human Rights and Judicial Reform. 
Support for a broad range of human rights, peace 
process, and programs to strengthen democracy, 
judicial reform and the rule of law in Colombia. 
- DoJ (Department of 
Justice) 








$441.9 Expansion of Counter-Narcotics Operations into 
Southern Colombia to help the government gain 
control of drug producing regions. Includes helping 
persons displaced by conflict (Colombia has the 
world's fourth-largest population of internally displaced 
persons) and technical assistance to farmers in 
southern Colombia. 
- DoS (Department of 
State) 
- DoD (Department of 
Defense) 
- DEA 






$174.0 Alternative Economic Development to help small 
farmers growing coca and opium poppies make the 
transition to legal economic activity as interdiction and 
eradication make narcotics farming less profitable. 









$465.6 Increased Interdiction to enhance U.S. and 
Colombian narcotics interdiction efforts and to fund 
interdiction programs in the Caribbean and in Central 











$115.6 Assistance for the Colombian National Police 




Total $1,319.1   
Table 2.   U.S. Interagency Assistance for Plan Colombia (FY2000)83 
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To bolster domestic support for the policy initiative in 2002, the Bush 
administration linked problems in Colombia to a narco-terrorist nexus, and used 
the threat to justify continuation of the Clinton’s policy. Note in Table 2 that the 
“Alternative Economic Development” program received less than 20 percent of 
the aid. Table 3 shows how 80 percent of U.S. aid is distributed to “hard side” 
issues and 20 percent to “soft side” issues.  
 
Military and Police Assistance Programs 
(millions of dollars; numbers underlined and italicized are estimates taken by averaging previous two years) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007, estimate  2008, request  
Subtotal 86.6 114.3 306.6 743.6 238.8 400.7 624.0 555.6 642.5 601.6 624.3 611.8 
Percentage 
of total 100% 99.6% 97.2% 76.3% 99.4% 77.6% 82.0% 80.5% 82.7% 82.0% 82.5% 81.4% 
Economic and Social Assistance Programs 
(millions of dollars) 
Subtotal 0 0.5 8.8 231.4 1.4 115.5 136.7 134.5 134.7 132.2 132.2 139.5 
Percentage 
of total 0% 0.4% 2.8% 23.7% 0.6% 22.4% 18.0% 19.5% 17.3% 18.0% 17.5% 18.6% 
 
Grand 
Total 86.6 114.8 315.4 975.0 240.2 516.2 760.7 690.1 777.2 733.8 756.5 751.3  
Table 3.   U.S. Interagency Aid to Colombia since 1997: Summary Tables84 
According to analysts, recent evidence shows that Plan Colombia's claims 
of success are wrong or irrelevant. They claim that the program is not only a 
“waste of time and money”85 but has also produced highly undesirable side 
effects including violence along common borders, displaced people and 
refugees, environmental damage, black markets weapons trade and drug 
trafficking. Furthermore, in terms of U.S. domestic politics, “neither the President  
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nor the Secretary of State have given the American people any coherent 
explanation of what is at stake in Colombia or of how massive military assistance 
can do anything but make matters worse.”86 
C. THE WASHINGTON – BOGOTÁ JOINT STRATEGY  
Colombia is home to as many as 30,000 "well-armed, drug-financed 
terrorists.”87 The U.S., by funding counter-drug and counter terrorism policies, is 
involved in an internal Colombian conflict. Analysts in the Andean Ridge call the 
relationship between the U.S. and Colombia the “Washington-Bogotá axis.” Its 
purpose is to unify the two countries' ideas, efforts, and objectives. For the U.S., 
the objective is to fight narco-traffic and for Colombia, the objective is to find a 
lasting resolution of its internal conflict. This section summarizes how the 
Washington-Bogotá joint strategy serves their common interests.88 
First, the U.S. maintains lines of communication, shares resources, 
exchanges information and new ideas, provides positive and negative feedback 
in a bottom up, top down, bilateral, and multilateral flow, and promotes 
Colombian institutions that embrace the idea of a joint effort to reduce illegal 
activities. To expand counter narcotics and counter insurgent groups operations, 
the U.S. provides advice, assistance, training, equipment, and intelligence to 
support the Colombian government’s objectives to locate, interdict, and isolate 
resources; freeze, confiscate, and close accounts both in Colombia and globally; 
and gain control of the drug producing regions.89 
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Second, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. Special Operations Forces 
have conducted specialized training exercises with every army in the Andean 
region, often avoiding effective civilian oversight or Congressional restrictions 
that apply to other military operations abroad.90 The U.S. provides Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance (ATA), training and equipment to Latin America.91 Building on the 
U.S. ATA, Colombia is improving its counter terrorism capabilities and 
strengthening its political will to combat terrorism in its own country. 
Third, the U.S. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) program helps foreign 
nations defend against existing or potential internal threats. According to 
SOUTHCOM, "while anti-drug operations are a sustained focus of the SOF effort 
in Latin America, the priority mission is military-to-military engagement."92 
Section 2011 of Title 10 governs SOF training with foreign militaries; it is widely 
applied in Colombia, where SOF forces participate mainly in counter narcotics 
operations, training and intelligence gathering. The SOF mission is oriented to 
avoid having “ungoverned areas" become sanctuaries for insurgents and drug 
traffickers.93 
Fourth, the U.S. Congress has authorized funds for training, security and 
infrastructure essential for Colombian legal system, judges, prosecutors, 
politicians and witnesses. Extradition to the U.S. is still the sanction that drug 
criminals fear most and public acceptance of this measure is increasing.94 
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Colombia exchanges information with U.S. law enforcement agencies and is 
working to overcome several weaknesses in its own court system.95 
Fifth, the Washington-Bogota axis works to disrupt terrorists’ financial 
infrastructures, specifically formal and underground methods for cross-border 
funds transfers through banks, businesses, financial companies, currency 
exchangers, and NGOs that channel funds for terrorist groups.96 Working with 
the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), Colombia has established a prototype Trade Transparency 
Unit (TTU) that examines anomalies in trade data for signs of customs fraud and 
trade-based money laundering.97 The Treasury Department has also set up a 
Terrorist Tracking Task Force (TTTF) to work with foreign governments to block 
terrorists’ access to funds.98 
Sixth, the U.S. has been funding Plan Colombia since 2000. In August 
2002, Congress passed Public Law 107-206 allowing Colombia to use U.S. aid 
for counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency as well as counter-narcotics 
purposes.99 According to the Latin America Working Group, between 1997 and 
2007, Colombia’s police and military will have received “almost exactly two out of 
every three dollars of U.S. security assistance for the entire region. Thanks to 
Plan Colombia, aid to Colombia today is about six times what it was in 1997.”100 
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D. PLAN COLOMBIA: INTER STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE 
GLOBALIZATION ERA 
With globalization and the expansion of technology, physical boundaries 
among "sovereign" territories are affected by the new, more competitive global 
economic system. However, emerging states like those in SOUTHCOM’s area of 
responsibility are unlikely to compete given their lack of political culture, 
technology and capital. This makes some developed countries dominant over 
others where interests overcome interstate friendships.101 According to the 
current SOUTHCOM Commander, Admiral James G. Stavridis, the U.S. is 
“fortunate to have as neighbors democracies that virtually all share similar 
values; unfortunately, poverty, inequality, and security challenges all contribute to 
a growing, frustrated expectation from the people for dramatic change.”102 He 
notes that SOUTHCOM’s mission to achieve regional cooperation is made more 
difficult by antagonistic political leaders who attempt to spread anti-U.S. views.  
Having reviewed the critical features of influence and trust, this analysis 
turns to U.S. policy in the era of globalization when U.S. actions increasingly 
influence the Colombian government and might gain the same influence with 
other Andean partners. Audrey Cronin argues that contemporary transnational 
terrorism and organized crime require “four levels of analysis, the individual, the 
organization, the state, and the international system because these four 
analytical ‘lenses’ provide clarity and intellectual coherence to what is in reality a 
complex and intricately intertwined series of actors.”103 Thomas Friedman 
suggests that globalization transcends territorial, socioeconomic, and political 
borders via a system of networks and relationships. He affirms that globalization 
can also influence actors on its “dark side.” Because states are no longer the 
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only actors on the world stage, globalization shows that the world is more 
integrated.104 State and non-state actors that resist the new world system will be 
left behind.105  
Moises Naim asserts that governments, including the Andean 
governments, currently face five wars on the “dark side” of globalization: drug 
and arms trafficking, alien smuggling, money laundering and intellectual property 
issues.106 In this regard, two important developments affect the security of all 
nations. First, the scope of primary actors in the international system is more 
complex and varied than a system containing only states. In addition, capitalism 
has become the major macroeconomic system, resulting in increased economic 
integration and, by extension, security integration.107  
These developments converge, with two implications in the Andes. First, 
globalization limits the effectiveness of the Colombian state in unilaterally 
shaping its own border security practices against transnational threats. Second, 
Colombian transnational threats (narco-guerillas, terrorism, drug trafficking and 
organized crime) are a greater concern than other issues and require a shared 
solution. This may seem to overemphasize the effects of globalization and 
downplay the fact that states remain major players in both internal and external 
affairs. However, if integration becomes the norm, integrated and cooperative 
approaches to national security are essential.108 
The 2006 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) identified two 
pillars of U.S. strategy. One pillar is to promote “effective democracies, and to 
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extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise developmental policies.”109 
The second pillar is to lead the fight by “a growing community of democracies” 
against “pandemic disease, [the threat of] terrorism, human trafficking, and 
natural disasters.”110 The NSS includes chapters on strengthening alliances and 
cooperative networks to prevent attack, diffusing regional conflict, igniting global 
economic growth, expanding development, building democratic infrastructure, 
and developing joint agendas to accomplish these objectives. In this view, 
USSOUTHCOM’s strategy in the Andean Ridge intended to promote regional 
security and stability in supporting democracies by fighting Plan Colombia’s 
transnational threats. Regional cooperative security is accomplished by activities 
that develop cooperative arrangements, trust building, and confidence building 
measures to reduce inter-state and regional tensions.111  
Ideally, Plan Colombia is appropriate for a successful cooperative 
network, because representatives from various U.S. departments and agencies 
are linked with their Colombian counterparts.112 However, while representation at 
the national and tactical levels is sufficient, U.S. representation is thin at the 
regional level.113 While it is clear that the Washington-Bogotá strategy requires 
cooperation between the U.S. and Colombia, for getting better outcomes, this 
strategy should be executed within a larger multi-national coalition, giving priority 
to the “soft approach” in order to address the majority of social problems – need 
for crop substitution and alternative income opportunities – that would result from 
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the eradication of narco-guerillas. This approach would improve on the current 
“hard approach” strategy which, giving the previous analysis in this thesis, is not 
yielding long-term results.  
A recent essay by Martin Gorman and Alex Krongard suggests that “a 
fundamental mismatch exists between the international threat environment and 
the current national security structure that undermines the ability of the U.S. to 
develop appropriate policies and implement comprehensive strategies.”114 
Others, however, submit that the U.S. has successfully executed extremely 
complex regional development initiatives and point to Plan Colombia as one such 
example. The truth lies somewhere in the middle. What is certain is that U.S. 
influence in South America met resistance when “neighboring countries began to 
feel the effects of violence in Colombia as the armed conflict took on an 
increasing regional dimension.”115 
Discomfort and opposition to U.S. military presence is “inevitably tied to 
the unilateral nature of Washington’s military policy, including the war in Iraq and 
attempts to exempt U.S. soldiers from jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).”116 The presence of so many personnel on military missions sends a 
message that the U.S. prefers force over diplomacy to settle supply side 
problems. Nonetheless, when dealing with social problems, it is important to 
keep in mind that soft approach measures work better than hard approach 
strategies.117  
Ecuador and Venezuela are particularly vulnerable to spillover from 
Colombia’s conflict. Narco traffickers and the three Colombian illegal armed 
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groups already use the vast border regions for operations. This endangers 
Colombia's neighbors, who are concerned about the weakening of the Colombian 
state.118  
The largest seizures of cocaine in 2005 were made by Colombia, the U.S., 
Venezuela, Spain, Ecuador, and Mexico in that order.119 However, as Table 4 
shows, there are no signs of large-scale coca cultivation outside Colombia, Peru, 




Table 4.   Reported cumulative eradication of coca bush (hectares) in the 
Andean Ridge, 1994 – 2006121 
This chapter has reviewed the link between the U.S. and Colombia and 
the need for a regional response when dealing with transnational threats in the 
era of globalization, when technology, capitalism and other improvements have 
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disrupted old barriers. The next chapter examines what the Colombian crisis has 
meant to Ecuador and Venezuela. The conflict in Colombia poses an undeniable 
regional threat, mostly visibly in the form of increased refugee flow, increased 
drug cultivation, and increased levels of violence from illegal cross border 
movement. 
 38
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IV. REGIONAL IMPACTS: ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA 
When things go wrong in your command, start searching for the 
reason in increasingly larger concentric circles around your own 
desk.  
Gen Bruce C. Clarke122 
A. EFFECTS OF DRUGS AND PLAN COLOMBIA ON THE ANDEAN 
ENVIRONMENT  
With the conclusion of the Cold War, the U.S. redefined its rationale for 
military engagements in Latin America with a focus on counter-narcotics 
missions. However, “unconventional adversaries are difficult to respond to in a 
discriminate and proportionate manner and the U.S. ability to carry out coercive 
actions has been shown to be less effective.”123 Nowadays, the U.S. does not 
have a vastly superior capability to use against unconventional threats. As Colin 
Gray notes, “there is a traditional American way of war and its features do not 
favor the strengths required to succeed against irregulars. [Furthermore,] 
American military culture has proved resistant to making radical adjustments in 
its style of warfare in order to meet the distinctive challenges posed by an 
irregular enemy.”124  
The internal conflict in Colombia poses a direct threat to regional stability. 
Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, and Brazil all share borders with Colombia 
and are affected to some degree by the crisis. Pace states,  
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The spillover into neighboring countries largely results from the 
corrupting effect of the narcotics trade and inadequate state control 
of the border in remote areas. As the U.S. assists Colombia in 
building counter-drug capabilities, it should also address the 
specific needs of Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, and other 
regional partners as well.125  
The U.S. is "part of the problem," according to Mance. 
The problem is that, by focusing so heavily on Colombia, the U.S. 
cannot deal with transnational problems. For example, Plan 
Colombia neglects the issue of Colombian refugees, leading the 
Ecuadorian government to echo popular concerns about the 
economic burden of hosting these people. Ecuador has complained 
about the violation of its sovereignty by the Colombian military and 
the effects of fumigation in border regions. The country’s president 
Rafael Correa has taken a strong stance against Plan Colombia, 
and the U.S. military presence in the region. Venezuela, under 
Hugo Chávez, has shown ideological sympathy with the FARC and 
the ELN.126 
The scenario in the Andean Ridge presents several structural problems 
that require analysis. The fragility of Andean democratic systems is cause for 
concern since these systems, by themselves, would probably be unable to solve 
internal or external crises. Relative agreement exists among the states in the 
Americas insofar as the main security threats come from non-state actors rather 
than from military attacks against their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Non-
state threats are more dramatic than previous ones and are asymmetric, in the 
sense of being "forms of attack against which States have no defense, and . . . 
tactics that decision makers will not abide.”127 After the attacks of September 11,  
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terrorism became the main concern of the U.S. government. However, the 
Andean region has experienced a relatively low incidence of international terrorist 
activity.  
This chapter focuses on the impacts on Ecuador and Venezuela. The 
significant general asymmetric threats in the larger Andean Region are 
summarized below. The situation in each Andean country has been described by 
the U.S. State Department.128 
Many incidents of violent urban crime occur in each country, particularly in 
the large cities. These incidents are associated with drug traffic and usage, 
trafficking of light weapons, and other illegal activities.129  
Bolivia has significant challenges to democratic rule by anti-government 
forces. Bolivia is heavily engaged in a major counter narcotics effort with 
significant support and partial funding from the U.S. Military training programs 
include technical training for counter narcotic operations, courses on civil-military 
relations, and resource management and human rights instruction to reinforce 
principles of democracy and civilian control of the military.130 
In Peru, the U.S. seeks to strengthen the government’s ability to interdict 
and disrupt narcotics production and distribution. Training in counter narcotic 
operations, professional military education, resource management, logistics and 
equipment maintenance provide the tools to professionalize and modernize 
Peru’s military. This training is particularly important to the demining efforts along 
Peru’s border with Ecuador in support of the 1998 peace settlement. According  
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to the U.S. State Department, “the Peruvian military continues to conduct 
operations against insurgents and narco-terrorists while respecting the rule of law 
and human rights.”131 
In Colombia, the government restarted coca aerial eradication and 
increased offensive operations against narco-guerilla groups along the 
Ecuadorian and Venezuelan borders, which, as noted above, produces negative 
second order effects in those two countries.  
Ecuador, a focus of this thesis, is a major drug-transiting country and is 
the site of U.S. activities that include counter narcotic operations, military 
instruction, resource management, logistics and equipment maintenance, and 
training to professionalize and modernize the local force. U.S. Special Operation 
Forces have trained the Ecuadorian military in demining and in fighting drug 
cartels and guerillas.132 
In Venezuela, the second focus of this thesis, the U.S. conducted 
combined airborne operations, light infantry, and weapons training before 
Chavez took office in 1999. Since Chavez became president, some senior 
military officers have been used for political purposes. The Armed Forces have 
received no U.S. training and the U.S. Military Liaison Group was expelled and 
relocated out of the Venezuelan military headquarters.133 
B. THE CASE OF ECUADOR  
Ecuador has received a great deal of overflow effect from Colombia. The 
effects include refugees and guerillas crossing the border, and coca and heroin 
cultivation that has "migrated" cross-border from Colombia.134 Violence and 
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refugees are serious issues. Ecuador already faces a host of economic and 
political problems, including eight presidents in the last ten years and a foreign 
debt that is serviced with a large part of the national budget.135  
Ecuador began feeling Plan Colombia’s negative second order effects 
several years ago. For example, the Colombian air force has pursued guerillas 
into Ecuadorian air space. And  
aerial spraying is not only missing targets by hitting crops and 
forests in Colombia, but it is crossing the border and doing the 
same in Ecuador. Thus, success in Colombia might mean 
devastation, both environmental and social, for Ecuador or another 
neighboring country.136  
In 2007, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated 
that “half a million civilians have crossed into Ecuador and Venezuela to avoid 
the violence,”137 with perhaps 250,000 Colombians having fled to Ecuador from 
internal conflict.138 Describing “legal” Colombian refugees, the UNHCR data in 
Tables 5 and 6 illustrates that Ecuador bears a disproportional burden. 
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Table 5.   People of Concern to UNHCR 2000-2002139 
 
Table 6.   Cross Border Number of Refugees140 
The relations between Ecuador and the U.S. are “generally good," despite 
contention over relatively limited U.S. assistance.141 In 2004, SOUTHCOM 
Commander General James T. Hill said Ecuador had shown “the political will to 
secure its border with Colombia and to fight drug traffickers.” A review of the data 
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in Table 7 and annual evaluation field trips to the Ecuador–Colombia border 
leads the author of this thesis to agree with Hill’s claim that “despite limited 
resources, the Ecuadorian military has placed many of its best troops on its 
northern frontier and has established cross border communications with the 
Colombian military. [Moreover] Ecuador continues to host one of the Southern 
Command’s Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) in Manta, which has been 
especially critical in providing coverage on the eastern Pacific vector of drug 
smuggling.”142 
 
Table 7.   U.S. Counter narcotics Assistance to Ecuador, FY 2000-FY 2007143 
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1. Ecuador's Major Contribution to the Situation: The 
Cooperative Security Location/ Forward Operating Location 
(CSL/FOL) in Manta 
The U.S. has operated military bases in Latin America since the early 
1900s, establishing army camps in Cuba during the Spanish-American war and 
in Panama at the beginning of U.S. canal construction. According to John 
Lindsay-Poland, 
These bases have served, explicitly, to protect U.S. government 
and commercial interests in the region. More recently, the U.S. 
military interest and funding for Plan Colombia, gave rise to a 
proliferation of new U.S. bases and military access agreements in 
the region.144  
After the closure of Howard Air Force Base in Panama , some wing assets 
moved to Puerto Rican airfields and Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in 
Aruba, Curacao, El Salvador and Ecuador.145 As Figure 5 illustrates, a northern 
drug source zone was based from Aruba and Curacao; the Andean region FOL 
was planned for Manta, Ecuador, and in 1999, a Central American FOL was 
established in Comalapa, El Salvador.146 The FOLs monitor the skies and waters 
of the region and “are key to increased surveillance operations in the United 
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suspicious flights gathered from FOLs and radar sites are shared with host nation 
security forces, which carry out the “endgame operation” of contacting and 
forcing or shooting down suspected smugglers.148 
 
  
Figure 5.   Latin American FOLs after Howard AFB in Panama, was closed149 
In 1999, the U.S. and Ecuador ratified a ten-year cooperation agreement 
that established the Manta FOL as the strategic site for U.S. anti-narcotics 
operations. For regional anti-drug efforts, the Ecuadorian base is located in “the 
key geopolitical strategic location.”150 According to Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Manta 
Air Base is “crucial to achieving “full [air] coverage in the region.”151 Therefore, 
“Ecuador plays a significant role in the ACI, together with Colombia’s cooperative 
attitude towards the U.S. policy on drug trafficking.”152  
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Although counter-drug FOLs are critical to the execution of the DoD’s 
detection and monitoring mission, “opposition among local constituencies 
remains a factor that could hinder further cooperation from potential partners.”153 
In fact, Ecuadorian social actors neither trust the U.S. presence and influence in 
the country nor agree with the incipient U.S. aid in comparison with their 
country’s effort to fight the narcotics business.  
The Manta FOL is a success.154 In 2005, Craddock affirmed that “since 
the establishment of the Manta CSL/FOL in 1999, the information resulting from 
its operations has resulted in the seizure of cocaine with a street value of $3.4 
billion.”155 According to Lt. Col. Javier Delucca, commander of the forward 
operating location's 478th Expeditionary Operations Squadron, “aircrews flew 
more than 1,200 missions from Manta in 2006, and helped seize more than 258 
tons of illegal drugs with an estimated street value of $5.2 billion.” By July 2007, 
he said, over 800 missions had helped capture $2.4 billion worth of drugs that 
year.156 U.S. embassy officials in Quito claim that more than 60 percent of the 
illegal drugs captured on the high seas of the eastern Pacific in 2006 resulted 
from information gathered by surveillance flights from Manta.157 According to a 
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from the Manta FOL has seized more than 250 tons of cocaine,”158 a record of 
success echoed the following year by Jose Ruiz, spokesperson for U.S. 
SOUTHCOM.159 
2. Ecuador's Perceptions and Expectations 
In the last five years, relations between Ecuador and Colombia have been 
tense. There are many causes. One is fumigation. Ecuador complained 
unsuccessfully to the government of Colombia and to the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and the UN that Colombian aerial eradication harmed 
people, animals and crops on the Ecuadorian side of the border.160 Other 
sources of tension include the failure of mutual agreements for information 
exchange, Colombian military actions on Ecuadorian sovereign territory, and 
increased criminal violence, refugees and illegal activities.161 Because of 
declining conditions and inadequate support and cooperation from the 
Washington–Bogotá axis, Ecuador does not want the Manta base agreement 
renewed after 2009. Despite those successes from U.S. perspective, in 2006, the 
Ecuadorian ambassador to Colombia was twice recalled to Quito for 
consultations, a diplomatic signal of a high level of discontent.  As researcher 
Fredy Rivera notes, “the most tangible piece of real estate that symbolizes these 
negative feelings has, over time, become Manta.”162 
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Situated adjacent to guerilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas 
in southern Colombia, Ecuador is the most exposed of Colombia’s cooperative 
neighbors. The Ecuadorian response to the Colombian crisis is characterized by 
a desire to remain neutral in order to avoid becoming more engaged in the 
dynamics of a conflict that is viewed as a sovereignty issue.163 Unlike 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, Ecuador has not designated Colombian 
leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries as terrorist organizations or 
belligerents.164 
Ecuador’s concern about escalation of the conflict is due to fears that 
Colombian military efforts against guerillas will result in even more rebel 
incursions and a larger refugee crisis.165 A neutral stance highlights the necessity 
for renewed cooperation with Colombia and other nations in the region to 
address the root cause of the conflict. Ecuador, in contributing to U.S. counter 
drug success with the Manta FOL, reasonably expects an increase in external 
support. The 200 million dollars in U.S. aid in the last seven years, compared 
with 5.3 billion dollars received by Colombia in the same period, does not 
adequately help Ecuador overcome the negative impacts of being Colombia's 
neighbor.166 
3. Ecuador's Actions 
Since Rafael Correa took office in 2007, Washington has worried about 
losing the Manta FOL. Correa has already publicly discussed using the base as 
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an international airport to link South America with Asia.167 On the other hand, the  
Ecuadorian Agency for Northern Border Development (UDENOR) has continued 
to implement Plan Ecuador, the master plan intended to be a "preventative 
alternative development" to illegal crops.168 
While Ecuador would prefer to remain neutral, it has taken steps to blunt 
the effects of potential spillover in key areas. In the late 1990s, the Ecuadorian 
military increased its troop presence on the common border as much as 800 
percent to avert guerilla and illicit activity.169 To address the increased refugee 
flows, Ecuador has lobbied for additional funding from outside sources and is 
currently working with the UNHCR. Despite Ecuador’s efforts to restore security, 
irregular armed Colombian groups continue to operate openly, and violence and 
the refugee problem remain major issues on the border.170 
C. THE CASE OF VENEZUELA  
Colombia and Venezuela are each other’s third-largest trading partners, 
after the U. S. and the European Union. The two governments have had an 
uneasy relationship for many years, stemming from border disputes and concern 
about the other’s intentions.171 Venezuelan President Chávez has provided at 
least tacit and probably material support to the Colombian rebels and has 
embarked on a major arms buildup.172 By early 2005, Venezuela had agreed to 
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purchase 100,000 Kalashnikov-style assault rifles and at least 10 helicopters 
from Russia, and had signed a deal to purchase ten transport aircraft and eight 
patrol boats from Spain.173 
Historically, relations between Colombia and Venezuela have been tense, 
with tensions tending to rise and fall depending on the specifics of the issue at 
hand. With regard to Plan Colombia, Venezuela has taken two different 
approaches: the pre-Chavez and post-Chavez responses.174 In the 1990’s 
Venezuela became increasingly concerned with the Colombian situation and built 
up troop strength along its border to deal with insurgents. The Venezuelan 
reaction changed in 1999 when Chavez took office. At first, Chavez declared 
himself “neutral” on the conflict, which many took as meaning he planned to 
recognize the FARC and the ELN.175 There are long-held suspicions that Chavez 
has supported leftist Colombian guerrillas. Although he denies such support, the 
State Department’s Terrorism Report maintains that units of Colombian narco 
guerillas often crossed into Venezuela “to rest and regroup with relative 
impunity.”176  
A significant amount of spillover activity has taken place at the 
Venezuelan border with Colombia over the years. As relations between these 
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that Chavez had broken protocol. He abruptly terminated the Venezuelan 
president's role as a mediator with the FARC in seeking a comprehensive 
release of hostages.177 
In January 2008, the former Colombian minister of defense declared that 
relations between the countries "may be at their lowest point in history" due to 
Chavez’s move to have the FARC and the ELN recognized as belligerents.178 
The Venezuelan Congress agreed to Chavez's request, a position that seemed 
to foster a confrontational stance towards Colombia. Chavez told Venezuela's 
National Assembly "although it will bother some people, I say the FARC and the 
ELN are not terrorist bodies. They are armies, true armies that occupy space in 
Colombia."179 He added, “All governments of the Americas and Europe that have 
the FARC and the ELN listed as terrorist organizations should un-list them 
because it is all just a mere pressure from the U.S.. They are insurgent forces 
that have a Bolivarian and political project that is respected here."180 Some 
political observers categorized this stance as a political-diplomatic victory for the 
guerilla groups, an interpretation reinforced by Chavez’s decision to suspend 
cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in 2005.181 
Table 8 provides indicators of problems at the Colombia-Venezuela 
frontier, where a porous border leads to significant opportunities for armed 
groups and criminal networks to smuggle weapons, drugs, and other contraband. 
The State Department notes that Venezuela continued to be “unwilling or unable 
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to assert control over its 1,400-mile border with Colombia.”182 Consequently, 
Colombian narco-guerillas regard Venezuelan border territory as safe area to 
conduct cross-border incursions, transship arms and drugs, rest, and secure 
logistical supplies, as well as to commit kidnappings and extortion for profit.183 
 
 Indicators Sub-indicators 
01. Lack of state penetration - Absence of state institutions 
- Lack of physical infrastructure 
- Social and cultural resistance 
02. Lack of monopoly of force - Organized armed group 
- Criminal networks 
- Population with access to arms 
03. Lack of border control  
04. External interference  
Table 8.   Indicators of Ungovernability, Colombia-Venezuela Border184 
Table 9 shows the amount of money that Venezuela has received in U.S. 
ACI assistance over the past eight years. Veillette notes that although ACI 
programs in Venezuela focus on counternarcotics cooperation and judicial 
reform, the Administration did not request any ACI funding for Venezuela for 
FY2008. This is not a surprise, given the weak relationship between the 
administrations. 
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Table 9.   U.S. Counter narcotics Assistance to Venezuela, FY 2000- FY 2007185 
1. Venezuela's Perceptions and Expectations  
The perceptions and expectations of Venezuela cannot be separated from 
the political agenda of its current president. According to Greg Palast, to gain 
regional support and enhance his global prestige, Chavez seeks to spread his 
“Bolivarian Revolution” by rejecting the Washington and International Monetary 
Fund neo-liberal agenda and replacing it, in the words of the The Wall Street 
Journal, with an “International Hugo Fund.” Chavez uses the nation's oil money 
to provide other forms of financial aid by trading with governments of the left that 
now preside over about half of the population of the region.186 Mark Weisbrot 
writes, “He is trying to assemble a bloc of leftward swinging nations that can be 
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set against the U.S. on matters of trade and international leadership.”187 Chavez 
has also strengthened the monopoly of OPEC revenues by eliminating contracts 
from some foreign oil companies.188  
Chavez rejects U.S. and European support, focusing on Latin American 
solidarity. His strategy is based on open confrontation with the U.S.189 Franklin 
Foer writes, “Chavez embraces a homegrown style of nationalism underpinned 
by Venezuelan heroes while breaking with imported models of Marxism-
Leninism.”190 He presents Venezuela as a victim of U.S. imperialism and he has 
assumed an important role on the world political stage with his attitude of 
confrontation.191 
2. U.S. Assessment of Venezuela 
The Bush administration’s reaction to Chavez combines hostility and 
provocation.192 This has forced the U.S. to adopt a defensive stance of “for the 
U.S., or against us,” an approach with no room for maneuver that appears to be 
the wrong strategy.193  
In 2005 and 2006, the Bush administration specified that Venezuela failed 
"to adhere to its obligations under international narcotics agreements," and did 
not cooperate in antiterrorist efforts. As a result, U.S. defense materiel and 
services cannot be sold to Venezuela.194 The U.S. National Security Strategy of 
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March 2006 declares that Venezuela's president is "a demagogue awash in oil 
money [who] is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region.”195 
The State Department's annual Country Reports on Terrorism for 2007 asserted 
that Chavez “persisted in public criticism of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts, 
deepened Venezuelan relationships with Iran and Cuba, and was unwilling to 
prevent Venezuelan territory from being used as a safe haven by Colombian 
terrorist groups.”196 Those groups, on the U.S. State Department's list of "foreign 
terrorist organizations," are effectively international outlaws.197 
3. Venezuela's Actions 
To remain in power, the Venezuelan President is conducting a strategy 
based on the following elements of national power.  
In the diplomatic field, Chavez is applying a hostile and audacious foreign 
policy against “the empire.” He focuses on attaining greater Latin American 
integration in order to be less dependent on U.S. influence. He uses “oil 
diplomacy”198 and the promise of “pluri-polarity” to make Venezuela a new 
regional power. It also enhances his popularity domestically and in other 
countries.199 He incites controversy in foreign policy by making high-profile visits 
to Cuba, South America, and the Middle East and making strident speeches 
before the UN General Assembly, all while supposedly flirting with leftist guerillas 
and making a territorial claim on Guyana.200 
In the military field, Chavez is dramatically increasing the size of his armed 
forces and buying large amounts of armaments and equipment. Chavez wants to 
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arm the people so they can form a guerilla resistance against any U.S. 
invasion.201 For that purpose, in January 2008 he proposed that the members of 
the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of America (ALBA)--Nicaragua, Bolivia, 
Cuba, Venezuela and Dominica Island--create a defense council and military 
forces for the organization because “the enemy is one, the empire.”202 He has 
begun organizing citizen militias, changed from American to Cuban military 
advisors, and assigned citizens to read books on asymmetric warfare. 
Fortunately, there is no evidence that the Chavez administration has weapons of 
mass destruction, nor is there evidence it is trying to get them.203  
In the economic and financial fields, he has used Venezuela’s oil wealth to 
buy a substantial leadership role in the region. He is encouraging other countries 
to create a Bank of the South to “free the region from the international finance 
system.” According to international reports, Venezuela withdrew all of its assets 
held in U.S. banks and transferred them to the Bank for International Settlements 
in Switzerland.204 The U.S. wants to improve its relationship with Latin America 
by expanding commerce through the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
agreement, but Chavez has proposed an alternative regional trade agreement 
that would leave out the U.S.205 
In the social field, Chavez always seeks great psychological impact on the 
poor, who have felt cheated by generations of politicians, by supporting programs 
that he calls “misiones” (a religious allusion to the Cuban approach of exporting 
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socialism to Latin America). An economic and political supporter of Fidel Castro 
for more than $2 billion annually,206 Chavez has been introducing all the 
elements of the Cuban system into Venezuela. This is a disturbing sign in a 
country where, in the words of Sullivan and Olhero, he “replaced the country’s 
multiparty democracy with a political system that revolves around himself, in 
essence a cult of personality.”207 Currently Venezuela has “humanitarian 
missions” comprised of several thousand Cuban doctors and teachers who live 
and work in the countryside. Programs include political indoctrination, 
government-subsidized grocery stores, neighborhood food programs, new 
schools, access to the internet, and public works projects.208 Because Chavez 
means hope, “some polls show that Venezuelans are more confident about their 
economic future than Canadians or Americans.”209 
D. SUMMARY 
According to trust and influence theories, the international community 
should assess each neighboring country’s performance in order to succeed 
against illegal groups. Clearly, Ecuador and Venezuela are so different as to 
require different approaches. Despite its lack of resources and a deep respect for 
issues of sovereignty, Ecuador has made a great effort to fight transnational 
threats in its own territory, and its Manta AFB is an excellent Forward Operating 
Location for the Pacific coast. Conversely, Venezuela, with its “oil diplomacy,” 
aims for its own goals, goals not broadly shared by the international community. 
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Given the challenges and keeping in mind politically sensitive issues of 
sovereignty, what is needed is cross-border cooperation on themes such as rural 
development, arms trade, aerial fumigation, treatment of refugees, rules of 
military engagement, and extradition agreements of suspected outlaws.  
Unfortunately, the reality is that “U.S. policy is distorted towards Colombia 
and its primary mechanism for military and economic support to the region--Plan 
Colombia--has concentrated overwhelmingly on that country.”210  
If the U.S. is to develop a regional approach to the conflict, it will 
have to make compromises. In practice, this would mean a less 
militarized approach, with a greater role for alternative development 
strategies and negotiation. So far, the U.S. has shown no 
inclination for such a change. What the U.S. should realize is that a 
truly international and regional response is essential if the security 
situation in the Andean Region is to improve.211 
To maintain the focus of this thesis on the supply side and get some 
lessons from the analysis, Chapter V highlights the strengths and weaknesses of 
Plan Colombia. 




V. PLAN COLOMBIA: TEMPLATE FOR SUCCESS?  
In theory, theory and practice are the same, in practice they are 
not. 
Albert Einstein, 1921212 
The 21st century will see “increasing engagement with non-state and non-
traditional actors of an asymmetric proportion.”213 Fathali Moghaddam argues, 
“[T]he best long-term policy against terrorism is prevention, which is made 
possible by nourishing contextualized democracy on the ground floor."214 
However, in the Andean Ridge, an atmosphere of insecurity is evident. Accepting 
that “even the most extreme and unusual forms of political behavior can follow an 
internal, strategic logic,”215 and “even the most highly motivated terrorist groups-- 
the Colombian narco-guerillas as well--can be deterred from certain courses of 
action,"216 still, “successful deterrence depends on both the severity of the threat 
and its credibility.”217 Due to the “difficulty of achieving perfect security,” winning 
the war on terrorism consists of reducing terror to an ineffective movement.218  
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Addressing the Andean region as a scenario of political and social 
instability, Robert Rotberg, in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of 
Terror, claims that some states fail because they are convulsed by internal 
violence. Their incapacity to deliver political goods is the crucial element for 
understanding the boundaries of a fragile state.219 The U.S., through 
SOUTHCOM, can have a significant positive influence in Latin America because 
“national" challenges like terrorism, drug trafficking, and transnational crime that 
affect regional stability need cooperative solutions. A conference of the 34 
American nations' defense ministers declared in October 2006 that collaboration 
in pursuing this goal is essential.220  
A. LESSONS LEARNED  
From the supply side, Plan Colombia has been moderately successful 
within a few narrowly defined and short-term parameters. It failed to achieve its 
original strategic objectives and has not produced core changes in Colombia that 
will ensure long-term and sustained success.221 There are a few strengths that 
can be taken away from the plan, but most of the lessons learned involve pitfalls 
that should be avoided as the U.S. develops its regional engagement 
strategies.222 
1. Strengths 
According to some individuals familiar with the work of SOUTHCOM, there 
is little good to say about the national level network for Plan Colombia policy 
                                            
219 Robert Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, (Brookings Institution 
Press, February 2003), 7-8. 
220 Stavridis, 34. 
221 Jens Erik Gould, “The Failure of Plan Colombia," The American Prospect, April 23, 2007, available 
from http://tapdev.browsermedia.com/cs/articles?article=the_failure_of_plan_colombia, (accessed January 
13, 2008). 
222 Johnson et al., 10. 
 63
development and little at the regional level strategy to support it.223 On the 
ground in Colombia, however, the various individuals, groups, and agencies 
charged with executing Plan Colombia have developed an outstanding network 
that has insured some success at this level.224  
Unfortunately, the main effort of Plan Colombia is a temporary success 
story. A large amount of coca was eradicated in the early years of the program 
and trafficking routes were successfully interdicted. Arrests and extraditions of 
drug traffickers dramatically increased.225 The street price of cocaine increased, 
and the purity of the product decreased. All of this means that drugs were 
interdicted.226 These successes primarily resulted from men and women on the 
ground destroying crops, interdicting smuggling routes, and making arrests. This 
is a network success that can be attributed to the fact that the vast majority of 
civil servants and military personnel are committed professionals who will support 
a coordinated effort when they are completely immersed in it and living it on a 
day to day basis. The lesson is that an efficient network is the product of people 
interacting on a daily basis; it cannot be created solely through the formulation of 
a bureaucratic structure.227 
2. Weaknesses 
Plan Colombia resulted from a number of analytical errors and false 
assumptions that led to poor policy at a national level and a misguided strategy 
at a regional level.228 Despite tacit nods to the “soft-side” elements of the plan 
                                            
223 Johnson et al. 
224 Bantz J. Craddock, “Challenges in Latin America," testimony to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Mar 2005, available from http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/Mar/16-51355.html, (accessed 
August 2007).  
225 Laura Carlsen, “Militarizing Mexico: The New War on Drugs," Foreign Policy In Focus, July 12, 
2007, available from http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4373, (accessed January 11, 2008). 
226 "Below the Radar," 6. 
227 Johnson et al., 11-12. 
228 Myles R. Frechette, “Colombia and the United States: The partnership, but what is the endgame?" 
U.S. Army War College, Strategies Studies Institute, February 2007, iii. 
 64
associated with nation building, Plan Colombia was always about drugs on the 
streets of the U.S.229 The lesson here is to allow the expertise, within a 
coordinated network, guide policy formation. If the policy is flawed, no amount of 
money or brilliant execution will get the job done.  
Nothing happens in a vacuum and that is especially obvious when 
analyzing political, social, and economic effects of policy on a region. Initially, 
Plan Colombia focused solely on Colombia and failed to consider the entire 
Andean region. Within a short period, trafficking routes, coca production, and 
guerillas began to move across the poorly controlled borders to escape the 
effects of Plan Colombia.230 Additionally, many within the Colombian government 
and the larger populace mistrusted or flat-out opposed the policies. Much of the 
problem was cultural with deep historic roots. Few if any regional dynamics were 
considered in the policy or strategy.231 The lesson is that poorly coordinated 
policy will involve an entire network in dealing with the second, third, and tenth 
order effects. Rather than being driven by ideological or political agendas, the 
process should reflect the realities of the region.232 
Implementation flows from strategy, which in turn flows from policy. 
Everything is linked. Plan Colombia focused almost exclusively on drug 
networks, and so strategy and implementation focused on interdiction networks. 
It is not surprising that the military became the lead agent for planning and 
execution, receiving 79% of the funding. (See Figure 6) Despite tacit support for 
strengthening the rule of law and institutions, there was no real focus on 
increasing the capacity to deliver services such as education, health care and  
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infrastructure.233 The lesson is to make sure the right tool is chosen to match the 
problem. Plan Colombia was overly military in planning and execution. A 
balanced network approach would have been more effective.234 
 
 
Figure 6.   Percentages of U.S. Contribution to Plan Colombia235 
In conclusion, the plans, directives, and initiatives generated at the policy 
level should be familiar to the people who implement them as they flow to the 
operational level and beyond. In the international arena, if policy can maintain 
open international lines of communication, share resources, exchange 
information and new ideas, and provide positive or negative feedback in a bottom 
up and top down flow, then the walls of network problems will certainly be broken 
down.  
Using the review of the literature and fieldwork that addressed sources 
from various countries, Chapter VI tests this study’s hypothesis, broadly 
proposes a regional roadmap, and provides conclusions and recommendations 
to improve the relationships among the U.S. and Colombia’s neighbors, Ecuador 
and Venezuela, whose reactions to Plan Colombia vary significantly.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, 
perhaps, the end of the beginning.  
--Winston Churchill, 1942236 
The Logical Framework approach argues that solving problems requires 
the involvement of all the stakeholders or actors in any way related to the 
problem at hand. To solve the problem,  
[W]e must first understand the stakeholders. The objectives of this 
step are to reveal and discuss the interest and expectations of 
persons and groups that are important to the success of the 
plan.237  
In an effort to avoid bias, the author of this thesis attempted to collect data 
from the perspective of representatives of different countries involved in the 
issue. Unfortunately, despite efforts, it was impossible to get the cooperation 
necessary to support a synergic strategy for a multilateral approach to the 
transnational threat of narcotic trafficking that fuels terrorist activities.238 Perhaps 
this is understandable given the political sensitivity of this particular issue.  
According to the original thesis proposal and by profiting from various NPS 
sources and Ecuadorian military attaches in the U.S., Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, this research kept correspondence with civil and 
military officials who are familiar with this subject. Contacts were made with 
individuals associated with USSOUTHCOM, USSOCOM, FBI, the Treasury 
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Department, SOF units, and with national and regional representatives in the 
Andean Ridge. Additionally, effective cooperation was obtained from 32 
individuals such as a former Ecuadorian minister of defense, a former 
Ecuadorian Army commander, two police national directors of other Andean 
countries, as well as political analysts of the region, teachers from local 
universities, and military and police attaches. It is worth mentioning that the 
author of this investigation assured people interviewed that their comments 
would be anonymous. 
This thesis uses data collected through interviews and in the formal and 
empirical literature, taking into account that a long-term solution demands an 
objective approach that rejects both nationalism and overconfidence. In any 
case, fighting a problem requires measures and actions be taken to confront it; 
avoidance is not a solution. Karl Von Clausewitz, two centuries ago, warned 
decision makers to use all the elements of power, not just military force, to create 
desired outcomes.  
[T]here is another way. It is possible to increase the likelihood of 
success without defeating the enemy’s forces. I refer to operations 
that have direct political repercussions that are designed in the first 
place to disrupt the opposing alliance or to paralyze it, that gain us 
new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. If such 
operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve 
our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the 
goal than the destruction of the opposing armies.239 
This chapter presents the results of the research interviews and the 
hypothesis test, followed by conclusions, recommendations and a proposal for a 
broad regional road map for dealing with narco-terrorism as a transnational 
threat.  
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A. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
• Has Plan Colombia Ignored Neighboring Countries?  
 
Figure 7.   Question 1:  Has Plan Colombia Ignored Neighboring Countries? 
The majority answered this question affirmatively, but they also stated that 
Colombia, as a sovereign state, has the right to control policy inside its own 
borders. (As noted above, however, aerial coca eradication causes health and 
environmental damage that, with cross-border violence and illicit activities, 
affects the social environment along Colombian frontiers.) 
• In response to Plan Colombia, what actions have been taken by 
Ecuador and Venezuela and how do you appraise those 
measures?  
 
Figure 8.   Question 2: Neighboring Countries’ Actions 
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Officials highlight four main actions as the best way to mitigate and 
overcome Plan Colombia’s negative second order effects. The first is to show 
deep respect for the international principle of non-intervention in Colombian 
sovereign issues, along with good will and cooperation in finding a peaceful, 
lasting solution to its internal conflict. Second, strengthen the military and police 
presence on the common border to avoid the spillover of illicit activities. Third, 
request international support to mitigate the refugee problem and introduce 
alternative development programs for the peasants’ transition to a licit way of 
living. Finally, Ecuadorian officials state that their country has created its own 
plan, Plan Ecuador, as a policy that deals exclusively with social development 
along the common border.  
• Related to Plan Colombia’s negative second order effects on 
neighboring countries, what has been Washington and Bogotá's 
action, reaction, and/or effects? 
 
Figure 9.   Question 3:  Washington-Bogota Action/Reaction/Effects 
A consensus exists among neighboring countries that Washington–Bogotá 
have not produced an acceptable response. Moreover, neighbors demand 
alternate methods of coca eradication and control on Colombia's borders. 
Conversely, Colombian officials state that since drug trafficking and insurgency 
threaten democracy, they are asking for international cooperation to help resolve 
their internal conflict.  
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• What other factors in the Andean Ridge should influence U.S. 
policy and implementation? 
 
Figure 10.   Question 4:  Other Andean Ridge Factors 
Andean countries attribute narcotic trafficking to demand, not supply. 
However, taking a realistic approach to shared responsibilities, they ask for 
international aid to implement alternative development programs and improve 
human rights. Sovereignty is a key factor, but successful policy implementation 
must address other features, such as unstable democracies, high levels of 
corruption, ancestral land claims, and low levels of education.  
• For the Andean countries, what are the main consequences of their 
refusal to sign the International Criminal Court (ICC) Article 98 
agreement, which would benefit U.S. military personnel? 
 
Figure 11.   Question 5:  Consequences of Refusal to Sign ICC Art. 98 Agreement 
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Four out of the five Andean countries did not sign the ICC Article 98 
Agreement (Colombia was the exception). As a result, the U.S. reduced military 
assistance and applied coercive diplomatic and economic measures. The 
Washington – Bogotá axis kept a closer cooperation that was perceived by 
neighboring countries as a “unilateral” approach for fighting narco-terrorist 
activities based on an increase of Colombian military capabilities while producing 
a regional military misbalance. 
• What lessons can be learned from the Andean Counter-drug 
Initiative and Plan Colombia?  
 
Figure 12.   Question 6:  Plan Colombia and ACI Lessons Learned 
The people interviewed raised interesting points, like the need for a 
political rather than a military solution, and the need to attack the root causes of 
the drug problem, while simultaneously fighting the supply side to increasing the 
street price of cocaine and reduce its purity. For better results on the supply side, 
they claim that Plan Colombia is a shortsighted policy with irrelevant results. 
They also suggest centralized planning and decentralized execution for 
improving the function of local actors. Finally, they recommend avoiding collateral 
damage from aerial coca eradication, the spread of violence that comes from 
Colombian state and non-state actors, and population displacement.  
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• What kind of policies, plans, programs, and/or strategies will 
Andean nations support politically? 
 
Figure 13.   Question 7:  Initiatives that Andean Nations will Support Politically 
Plan Colombia, as a politically sensitive issue, requires tactful treatment. 
The Andean nations have the will to support political initiatives that improve local 
development along with a multilateral approach to transnational threats. In light of 
Washington’s full assistance to the Colombian government, they see themselves 
as put to one side. Thus, the Andean states will agree totally with any U.S. 
domestic anti-drug educational program and other initiatives to decrease the 
demand for illicit drugs.  
B. TEST OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
This investigation hypothesizes that Plan Colombia caused unintended 
negative consequences in neighboring countries due to a poor understanding of 
regional relationships. The research confirms the hypothesis. Plan Colombia 
produces several unintended negative effects on neighboring countries. Reaction 
to these effects varies from country to country, as is the case with Ecuador and 
Venezuela. There is no doubt that Colombia has stoically withstood internal 
violence for several decades. Nevertheless, the Washington–Bogotá axis has to 
realize that Colombia is neither geographically nor geopolitically isolated. 
Colombia is located in the heart of the Andean Ridge, and conflict there impacts 
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neighboring countries. Something must be done to avoid collateral damage from 
high levels of violence coming from Colombian state and non-state actors (i.e. 
the illegal presence and activities of a group of the FARC inside the Ecuadorian 
soil and its consequent Colombian armed forces’ attack in March 1st, 2008)240, 
increased criminal activity, population displacement, and aerial coca eradication. 
Due to political sensitivities regarding sovereignty issues in the Andean region, a 
regional military-only approach to the Colombian conflict is not an acceptable 
solution. Nonetheless, countries can support initiatives originating with OAS’s 
resolutions or other agreements while avoiding interference in sovereign issues.  
C. CONCLUSIONS  
This thesis has addressed the United States’ two main concerns in the 
Andean Region, drugs and insurgencies. Plan Colombia impacted drug 
trafficking in Colombia, although statistics indicate only a small decline in U.S. 
cocaine and heroin use.241 The U.S. and Colombia have lost popular support 
throughout the region, but this support will return as Colombia and the U.S. 
address the needs of the rural population.242 With careful identification of 
expectations and efforts to address them, the U.S. will regain trust, thus allowing 
better relationships and more options to exert influence in the region. Though this 
study criticizes some U.S. actions, the U.S. has increasing influence with the 
Colombian government and can earn the same increased influence with its other 
Andean partners.243  
In a broad Andean overview, Bolivia’s main concerns are its weak 
democracy and the drug issue. Peru is recovering its political stability while it 
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undergoes some insurgent and drug difficulties. Ecuador is still dealing with drug 
trafficking and the impact of Colombian state and non-state actors on its northern 
border. Colombia keeps managing despite internal violence; however, Colombian 
guerillas and terrorists no longer fight for ideals, seeking instead the economic 
benefits of drug export and some publicity. Finally, Venezuela President Hugo 
Chavez's agenda involves open confrontation with the U.S. to improve his 
leadership and remain in power.244 
In the case of Ecuador, the U.S. State Department reports that the U.S. 
and Ecuadorian governments are “cooperating to improve interdiction of illicit 
drugs and chemicals and to improve Ecuadorian safeguards against terrorism 
and illegal migration, but more coordination and improvements are needed.”245 
Nonetheless, as Mance notes, “Ecuador does not simply want [insignificant] 
resources, it also want its view to be incorporated into policy.”246  
In the case of Venezuela, despite poor diplomatic relations with the U.S., 
the Council on Foreign Relations' report “Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the 
Challenges of Colombia and the Region,” recommends  
Maintaining and amplifying military-to-military relations between the 
two countries. Personnel exchanges, military contacts, and student 
exchanges at U.S. military schools are almost the only functioning 
components of the bilateral relationship and can serve as a vehicle 
for cooperation on counter drug and other security-related 
issues.247 
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To meet the challenge, U.S. decision makers should come up with a 
creative and effective new policy for the Andean Ridge drug supply side. As 
Douglas MacArthur stated, "New conditions require for solution, new and 
imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.”248 Lessons from the 
perspective of Field Marshal Sir William Slim are also relevant.  
It is astonishing how obstinate allies are, how parochially minded, 
how ridiculously sensitive to prestige and how wrapped up in 
obsolete political ideas. It is equally astonishing how they fail to see 
how broad-minded you are, how clear your picture is, how up to 
date you are and how co-operative and big-hearted you are. It is 
extraordinary.249  
In addition, Audrey Cronin points out that  
a set of inaccurate or incomplete assumptions about the causes of 
terrorism often provides the impetus for policy prescriptions. These 
assumptions should be reexamined to improve the likelihood of 
success.250  
The analysis of Plan Colombia highlights a few strengths and reveals 
some significant shortfalls, particularly with regard to strategic development at 
the regional level. In this scenario, trust and influence could be lost because 
some activities are not coordinated and synchronized, and the dissemination of 
contradictory information is extensive.  
One of the most important cultural misperceptions involves expectations. 
Washington-Bogotá’s expectations were to achieve military goals, like the defeat 
of drug cartels and narco-guerilla groups. In contrast, the local population’s 
expectations were to have a reliable source of income from legal activities while 
governmental institutions provide electricity, food, medical care, labor 
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opportunities, and safety from illegal groups. The governments needed visible 
actions to improve the average quality of life of local peasants who might be 
involved in the drug or narco-guerilla business but are trying to make a transition 
to legal occupations. As Baker notes, “There is a direct correlation between 
credibility and the ability to demonstrably improve the quality of life, physical 
security, and stability in a society.251 
The U.S. should implement a policy that includes political, diplomatic, and 
economic elements so that the focus on, and assistance to Colombia, is 
distributed in a more equitable way over the entire region.252 The other countries 
have lost assistance unjustly because the U.S. considers them “less needy.”253 
Reality shows a high demand for drugs in the international market promotes 
narco-guerilla activity, and that activity is not just confined to Colombia. The 
Colombian “guerrillas” left behind their ideals and political projects many years 
ago (if, indeed, they ever had them).254 Success in this long and complex conflict 
requires U.S. decision makers develop a strategy that takes into account the 
lessons learned in Plan Colombia’s seven-year history. The U.S. should also 
consider expanding the parameters of Plan Colombia to include countries such 
as Ecuador and Venezuela, to ensure that any gains in Colombia are not 
undermined. To influence the Andean region and prevent migration of problems 
to Colombia's neighbors, a broader drug control policy is needed.  
D. SHAPING THE FUTURE  
Keeping in mind that each country needs a different approach, the U.S. 
should encourage international synergistic efforts in the face of transnational 
threats. According to Lindsay-Poland,  
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To live up to the democratic ideals of its people, the U.S. should 
adopt a new security doctrine in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Such a doctrine would value ties with civilians more than ties with 
the military as the sphere where democratic decision-making takes 
place. It would dedicate more resources to addressing the 
economic causes of conflict, rather than to building installations 
designed for the use of force.”255 
Although Plan Colombia eroded locals’ trust through unsatisfied 
expectations, there is hope. The U.S. support of Plan Colombia essentially 
overhauled the Colombian military and security capacity and enabled Colombian 
President Alvaro Uribe’s landslide reelection.256 The reelection, made possible 
by 2005 legislation, was a landslide because the urban population is mostly 
protected from drug cartels and narco-guerrilla operations. A core segment of the 
population trust the Colombian and U.S. governments. As the Colombian security 
capacity expands, so does its positive influence over the populace. If the U.S. 
can prevent the spread of the problem and mitigate the negative second and 
third order effects in neighboring countries, it can re-build enduring alliances. As 
governments strengthen at the core, their influence might extend to the 
disaffected outside urban areas. In addition, the U.S. needs to investigate the 
culture of its partners in order to understand people's expectations. Although no 
plan can satisfy everyone’s expectations, it can certainly identify what they are. 
As Jeffrey Pfeffer notes, emotion plays a large role in peoples’ actions.257 
Given the choice of influencing you through your heart or your 
head, I will pick the heart. It’s your head that sends you off to check 
Consumer Reports when you are thinking of purchasing a new car. 
It’s your heart that buys the Jaguar or the Porsche. 258 
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Symbolic words and gestures do not require a large investment for a 
rewarding payoff. For example, a U.S. funded fresh water pipeline would not cost 
much, and while it would not address all of a village’s needs, it would symbolize 
U.S. recognition and support. If the U.S. and its Andean partner governments 
listen to the peoples’ words and try to satisfy their expectations, at least 
symbolically, it may just pay off. In the long run, the Andean and U.S. counter 
drug plans need to expand beyond the current, narrow focus on interdiction and 
address more of the peoples’ needs. However, while the demand for drugs 
exists, someone, somewhere will satisfy that demand. A combination of stiffer 
U.S. domestic drug laws with efforts to limit supply will be more effective than 
addressing only supply.259 
E. REGIONAL ROADMAP FOR THE ANDEAN RIDGE 
Vanda Felbab-Brown confirmed the relationship between counter-drug 
and counter-terrorism efforts, explaining how the production and trafficking of 
drugs fuels militarized conflicts.260 (See Figure 14) Given U.S. capability and 
credibility, fighting terrorist organizations should involve a strategy to convey to 
the adversary their low probability of success. Michael Vickers suggests, “Getting 
the right people in place to plan and execute the global war on terror ... is far 
more important than developing the right organizational arrangements.”261 
Employing the right person for the right job is a simple concept, but it is not 
simple in reality. It is certainly not simple for Plan Colombia. Trager and 
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Zargocheva write that any “new policy will emphasize the need to broaden the 
tools used to fight terrorism to more fully include the use of all instruments of 
power.”262  
According to Philip Heymann, success against Andean Ridge narco-
guerillas requires that any U.S. deterrence strategy be more persuasive than 
compellent on forceful.263 This requires attending to four critical areas: policy 
commitment, narco-terrorist financing, allies' and international cooperation, and a 
useful communication process along with an effective information campaign. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Drugs and Conflict: Actors in the Illicit Drug Economy264  
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1. Policy Commitment 
Although U.S. policymakers seem to regard worldwide terrorist activities 
and low intensity conflicts as less important in Latin America,265 they should be 
given a higher priority than they currently receive. Effective policy requires a 
systematic consideration of political, diplomatic, economic, legal, and social tools. 
Because narco-guerilla activities have second order effects that fill social needs 
in marginalized regions in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the U.S. should 
fund development programs to speed progress. The USAID should create oppor-
tunities for internally displaced and marginalized people to develop skills that will 
give them economic independence.266 Some officials state that this is in the U.S. 
interest. 
Any policy should also support the OAS and its security efforts in the 
hemisphere. It should take advantage of already existing international 
instruments such as the Inter-American Conventions on Terrorism, the Inter-
American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), the Inter-American Drug Abuse 
Control Commission (CICAD), and the Plan of Action on Hemispheric 
Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism.267 While counter-
narcotics and counter-terrorist operations are key elements in any strategy, the 
U.S. through the OAS must work with local governments to resolve political and 
economic issues.268 
                                            
265 Crenshaw, 75-76. 
266 Johnson. 
267 “Inter-American Convention against Terrorism," Organization of American States, June 2002, 
available from http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/AGres1840_02.htm, (accessed 
November 4, 2007). 
268 International Crisis Group, “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy," Latin America 
Report No. 6, Bogota/Brussels, November 13, 2003, available from 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/icg-col-13nov.pdf, (accessed January 12, 2008), 13.  
 82
2. Disrupt Narco-Terrorist Financing 
A second priority is to disrupt terrorists’ financing, specifically formal and 
underground methods for transferring funds across borders.269 The U.S. and its 
allies should expand counter-terrorist financing operations through three main 
actions. First, support local government efforts to confiscate accounts, block 
narco-terrorist funds in the U.S. financial system, and pursue money-laundering 
activities.270 Second, disrupt formal and informal narco-terrorist financial 
infrastructures.271 Third, apply sanctions such as visa restrictions and extradition 
to the U.S., as this is the sanction that terrorists and drug criminals fear most.272  
3. Allies and International Cooperation  
Allies perceive the Bush administration’s approach in the global fight 
against narco-terrorism as based too much on military action, and too little on 
transnational diplomatic actions.273 Chris Patten, the European Union's external 
affairs commissioner, states,  
It is almost impossible to deal with the dark side of globalization--
terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental 
degradation, and insecurity--unless it is a result of a multilateral 
engagement.274  
This means that all involved or affected countries are respected as equal 
partners. Martha Crenshaw suggests that “U.S. grand strategy should not ignore 
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interdependence in the domain of international security.”275 Cronin argues that 
“the projection of domestic civil conflict through international terrorism is not just 
an American problem; it may be a systemic challenge for the international 
community.”276  
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says, “The nation is 
at war with terrorist organizations that pose a threat to U.S. security and other 
societies that cherish the principles of self-government.”277 However, American 
influence engenders resistance and opposition in many parts of the world. 
Therefore, the U.S. should encourage and support Andean allied countries' 
efforts to implement stronger counter-terrorism policies. Such a commitment, 
according to Gabriel Marcella,  
would make the U.S. a more credible and effective ally, increase 
chances for success in the overall drug war, strengthen regional 
security in the conflicted Andean area, and make a dramatic 
improvement in international law and order.278 
4. Communication Process 
Good words should be followed by good deeds to develop enduring trust 
and that message must get out through a regional Information Operations (IO) 
campaign. It will be more likely to succeed if it is fast and honest, using a few 
simple, accurate, consistent, and frequently repeated messages.279 Themes and 
messages focused on specific audiences must be developed and distributed 
quickly. Leaders have to engage the media periodically and quickly after an 
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incident occurs to get the truth out to the people and to stay ahead of the 
adversary's disinformation and rumor campaigns.  
A successful communication strategy will “insure maximum beneficial 
impact on the perceptions of target audiences based on truthful information.”280 
Not talking to the press benefits the insurgents.281 American policy needs an 
excellent communication strategy and information campaign targeted towards an 
audience that will properly understand the signals sent by the U.S. and its 
allies.282 The media influences this process. For example, in the Arab world and 
regions with Islamic roots, people will not embrace an English-language news 
agency as their sole source of information. Applying this reasoning to the Andes, 
for the U.S. to influence a particular audience, it has to come up with creative, 
culturally relevant ways to do so.283 
F. FINAL THOUGHT 
Keeping in mind the significant regional variations in support and reactions 
to Plan Colombia, a serious U.S. commitment to political and economic policies 
will be more effective than military efforts against unconventional adversaries. A 
popular proverb says, “One must be and also appear to be.” Good American 
policy in the region requires an excellent communication strategy and information 
campaign to show that the U.S. intends the best for the Andes region. 
                                            
280 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan 2006 for the War on 
Terrorism, Washington, D.C., February 2006, 30. 
281 Baker, 18. 
282 Arreguin-Toft, 123. 
283 Chris Suellentrop, “It's just as fair as CNN," MSN Online, April 2, 2003, available from 





Figure 15.   Andean Counter-drug Initiative Countries284 
 
                                            
284 Veillette, 21. 
 86
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 87
LIST OF REFERENCES 
“Ally to Kidnappers: Venezuela's Hugo Chávez endorses Colombian Groups 
Known for Abductions, Drug Trafficking and Mass Murder." Washington 
Post, January 16, 2008, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/, 
(accessed January 22, 2008). 
“Andean Counterdrug Initiative.” Speech presented to the U.S. Senate Caucus 
on International Narcotics Control, Washington, D.C., September 17, 
2002, available from 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Andean+Counterdrug+Initiative.-
a098543780, (accessed September 12, 2007). 
“Andean Counter-drug Initiative Assessment." Office of the President of the 
United States, available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/summary/10002210.2004.html, 
(accessed September 16, 2007). 
"Andean Regional Initiative: A Policy Fated to Fail." July 2001, available from 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Andean+Regional+Initiative%3a+A+Policy+
Fated+to+Fail.-a077806344, (accessed September 12, 2007). 
Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Baker, Ralph O. “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s 
Perspective on Information Operations." Military Review, May-June 2006. 
Beers, Rand. “Statement of Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.” September 21, 
2000," Center for International Policy, Washington D.C., available from 
http://ciponline.org/colombia, (accessed August 25, 2007). 
Bewley-Taylor, Dave, Mike Trace and Alex Stevens. "Incarceration of drug 
offenders: costs and impacts." The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy 
Program, 2005, available from 
http://www.internationaldrugpolicy.net/reports/BeckleyFoundation_Briefing
Paper_07.pdf, (accessed November 9, 2007). 
Bouvier, Virginia M. “Evaluating U.S. Policy in Colombia." May 2005, available 
from http://americas.irc-online.org/reports/2005/0505colombia.html, 
(accessed August 25, 2007). 
 88
Business Horizons. “Chapter 9. The effective use of power.” Chapter rewrite, 
May/June 1986, Foundation for the School of Business at Indiana 
University, available from 
http://python.rice.edu/~arb/Courses/610_06_hew_9.pdf, (accessed 
January 12, 2008). 
Carlsen, Laura. “Militarizing Mexico: The New War on Drugs." Foreign Policy in 
Focus, July 12, 2007, available from http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4373, 
(accessed January 11, 2008). 
Carlson, Chris. “Venezuela, Nicaragua Propose Joint Military Force for Latin 
America.” January 28, 2008, available from 
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3105; (accessed January 29, 
2008). 
Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Plan Colombia: Washington's Latest Drug War Failure.” 
Defense and Foreign Studies, Cato Institute, July 27, 2001, available from 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3949, (accessed August 16, 
2007). 
Chacon, Alice M. “Venezuelan President Says His Greatest Rival is George W. 
Bush." Associated Press, June 12, 2004. 
Christman, Daniel W., John G. Heimann and Julia E. Sweig. Andes 2020: A New 
Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region. Council on 
Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action, 2004. 
Churchill, Winston. Speech in the Lord Mayor's Luncheon, Mansion House 
following the victory at El Alameinin North Africa. London, November 10, 
1942, available from 
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=388, 
(accessed February 12, 2008). 
Civico, Aldo. “Rethinking U.S.-Colombia Policy, The U.S. and Colombia Can 
Break Cycles of Violence and Repression." May 2007, available from 
www.americanprogress.org, (accessed August 20, 2007). 
Clark, Peter. “Failed ‘Plan’ in Colombia." July 31, 2000, available from 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030818/clark, (accessed May 16, 2007). 
Clinton, William J. “Presidential Decision Directive." Federation of American 
Scientists, 1997, available from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm, 
(accessed July 20, 2007). 
“Country Profile: Colombia." U.S. Federal Research Division, February 2007, 
available from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Colombia.pdf, 
(accessed November 25, 2007). 
 89
Craddock, Bantz J. “The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) works to 
combat terrorism and strengthen stability in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.” Testimony before the 109th Congress Senate Armed 
Services Committee, March 2005, available from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/Mar/16-51355.html, (accessed 
August 6, 2007). 
Crenshaw, Martha. “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of 
Strategic Choice.” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism. Washington 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. 
Crenshaw, Martha. “Terrorism, Strategies, and Grand Strategies." in Walter 
Reich ed., Origins of Terrorism. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 1998. 
Crisis Group. “Ecuador: Overcoming Instability?" Latin American Report No. 22, 
August 2007, available from 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4976, (accessed August 
25, 2007). 
Crisis Group. “Colombia: Presidential Politics and Peace Prospects." Latin 
America Report No. 14, Quito/Brussels, June 2005, available from 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3515, (accessed August 
25, 2007). 
“Crisis and Opportunity in the Andean region: The Cases of Colombia, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela." Inter American Dialogue, available from 
http://www.thedialogue.org/programs/country/andean_exec.asp, 
(accessed August 21, 2007. 
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "Sources of Contemporary Terrorism." in Cronin, Audrey, 
and James Ludes, ed., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University: 2004. 
Daniel [no last name]. "Chavez: The Colombian FARC is not a terrorist group." 
Venezuela News and Views, January 11, 2008, available from 
http://%20daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2008/01/chavez-colombian-farc-
is-not-terrorist.html, (accessed January 16, 2008). 
Dashtseren, Dashdavaa. "Border Protection and National Security of Mongolia." 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 2006. 
Davila, Juan Pablo. "Analyzing Managing with Power." les fiches de lecture de la 
Chaire D.S.O., 2001, available from 
http://www.cnam.fr/lipsor/dso/articles/fiche/pfeffer.html, (accessed August 
23, 2007). 
 90
DeShazo, Peter, Tanya Primiani and Phillip McLean. “Back from the Brink, 
Evaluating Progress in Colombia, 1999–2007." The Americas Program 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, November 2007. 
Dickson, Katie. "Chavez Checkbook Mission in the Caribbean Basin." Council of 
Hemispheric Affairs, August 29, 2007, from 
http://www.coha.org/2007/08/29/competition-contributions-and-contracts-
chavez%E2%80%99s-checkbook-mission-in-the-caribbean-basin/, 
(accessed January 23, 2008). 
"Ecuador: The Newest Front-Line State." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 26, Jun 30, 
2001. 
Ecumenical Human Rights Commission of Ecuador (CEDHU). Colombia Report, 
“Plan Colombia and its Consequences in Ecuador." March 2001, 
Information Network of the Americas (INOTA), available from 
http://www.colombiajournal.org/plancolombia_ecuador.htm, (accessed 
November 12, 2007). 
Edmunds, John C. “Brave New Wealthy World: Winning the Struggle for World 
Prosperity." Financial Times. Prentice Hall, Business & Economics, June 
2003. 
Einstein, Albert. "Famous Quotes from Albert Einstein," ed. Ruhani Rabin, April 
27, 2007, available from http://www.ruhanirabin.com/2007/04/27/famous-
quotes-from-albert-einstein/, (accessed February 8, 2008). 
Elazar, Daniel J. “The Rise and Fall of the Modern State System." available from 
http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles/risefall-state.htm, (accessed November 20, 
2007). 
"Europe, U.S. Diverging On Key Policy Approaches." Washington Post Foreign 
Service, March 4, 2002.  
Fagen, P. W., Juan Fernandez, F. Stepputat and R. V. Lopez. “Internal 
Displacement in Colombia: National and International Responses." 
Kongevej Working Paper, Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 
June 2003, available from 
http://isim.georgetown.edu/Publications/PatPubs/Internal%20Displacemen
t-Colombia.pdf, (accessed January 20, 2008). 
“FARC are not terrorists: Venezuela's Chavez." Euronews, available from 
http://www.euronews.net/index.php?page=info&article=464307&lng=1, 
(accessed January 20, 2008). 
Farah, Douglas. "A Tutor to Every Army in Latin America, U.S. Expands Latin 
American Training Role." Washington Post, July 13, 1998. 
 91
Farthing, Linda. “The Drug War in the Andes." Ithaca, New York, March 2006, 
available from http://ain-bolivia.org/drugwarCompleteLF.doc, (accessed 
September 16, 2007). 
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines 
Counterterrorism.” Washington Quarterly, 55–72, 2005, available from 
http://www.twq.com/05autumn/docs/05autumn_felbab.pdf, (accessed 
November 21, 2007). 
Foer, Franklin. “The Talented Mr. Chavez." Atlantic Monthly, May 2006. 
French, John R. P. and Bertram Raven. Bases of Social Power, ed. Dorwin 
Cartwright. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1959. 
Frechette, Myles R. “Colombia and the United States: The partnership, but what 
is the endgame?" Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
February 2007. 
Friedman, Thomas L. The New System. New York: Anchor Books, 2000. 
Gentleman, Judith A. The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of 
State Response. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 
2001, available from 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps13437/lps13437/andes.pdf, (accessed 
November 21, 2007). 
Gilpin, R. “The Second Great Age of Capitalism.” in The Challenge of Global 
Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
Gorman, Martin, and Alexander Krongard. "Goldwater-Nichols for the 
Interagency Process." Joint Force Quarterly, no. 39, October 2005. 
Gott, Richard, and Georges Bartoli. Hugo Chavez: The Bolivarian Revolution in 
Venezuela. New York, Verso, 2005. 
Gould, Jens Erik. “The Failure of Plan Colombia." The American Prospect, April 
23, 2007, available from 
http://tapdev.browsermedia.com/cs/articles?article=the_failure_of_plan_co
lombia; (accessed January 13, 2008). 
Graubner, Cornelius. “Development Oriented Drug Control Programme." 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2007, available 
from http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/07-0470.pdf, (accessed January 
12, 2008). 
 92
Gray, Colin S. Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American 
Way of War Adapt? Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, 2006; available 
from http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil, (accessed August 16, 
2007). 
Herwig, Kristine A. “The Environment, Plan Colombia, and U.S. Aid.” St. Paul, 
MN: Macalester College, September 25, 2001. 
Heymann, Philip. Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning Without War. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. 
Hill, James T. United States Army Commander, United States Southern 
Command, testimony before the 108th Congress Senate Armed Services 
Committee, April 1, 2004. 
Hodge, John W. “Managing with Power, Politics and Influence in Organizations: 
Book Reviews.” HR Magazine, October 1992, available from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3495/is_n10_v37/ai_13574906, 
(accessed January 12, 2008). 
Human Rights Watch. “Colombia: Defending Human Rights and the Role of the 
International Community.” 2002, available from 
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/americas4.html, (accessed February 12, 2008). 
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism. Organization of American States, 
June 2002, available from 
http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/AGres1840_02.ht
m, (accessed November 4, 2007). 
International Crisis Group. “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security 
Policy." Latin America Report No. 6, Bogota/Brussels, November 13, 
2003, available from http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/icg-
col-13nov.pdf; (accessed January 12, 2008). 
Jiménez Sandoval, Elega. “Understanding Modern Charismatic Leadership: 
Hugo Chávez and the 'Peaceful Revolution' in Contemporary Venezuelan 
Politics.” Waseda University, Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies, 
Ph.D. dissertation, September 2005. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Thinking about Strategic Culture.” International Security, 
vol. 19, Spring 1995. 
Johnson, Jeffrey, A. K. Williams, Johnny Weidmann, and Celso Andrade. “Plan 
Colombia as Interagency Road Map." Naval Postgraduate School, June 
2007. 
 93
Johnson, Stephen. “Helping Colombia Sustain Progress toward Peace." Heritage 
Foundation, October, 2005, available from 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg1887.cfm, (accessed 
October 21, 2007).  
Kauchak, Marty. “Eyes in the Sky.” Armed Forces Journal International, April 
2001, available from http://www.afji.com/AFJI/Mags/2001/April/eyes.htm, 
(accessed November 12, 2007). 
Kraul, Chris. “Chavez keeps up campaign to get rebels off terrorist list." Los 
Angeles Times, January 20, 2008, available from 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/latinamerica/la-fg-
farc20jan20,1,5969755.story, (accessed January 25, 2008). 
Lambakis, Steven, James Kiras, and Kristin Kolet. Understanding “Asymmetric” 
Threats to the United States. National Institute for Public Policy, 2002. 
Latin American Newsletters. “Anti-Colombian Sentiment on the Rise in Ecuador.” 
BBC Monitoring Americas, October 10, 2005; “Latin America and U.S. 
War on Terror: Spillover From Colombia,” May 2003; “Colombian FARC 
Guerrilla Base Discovered in Ecuador," EFE News Service, November 21, 
2003. 
Latin America Working Group. “Below the Radar: U.S. Military Programs with 
Latin America, 1997-2007." March 2007, available from 
http://www.lawg.org/misc/Publications.htm, (accessed September 16, 
2007). 
Leech, Garry. “Plan Colombia: A Closer Look.” July 2000, Information Network of 
the Americas (INOTA), available from 
http://www.colombiajournal.org/plancolombia.htm, (accessed August 18, 
2007). 
Levi, Margaret. “The State of the Study of the State.” Department of Political 
Science, University of Washington, December 2000, edited by Ira 
Katznelson and Helen Milner, available from 
http://www.yale.edu/leitner/pdf/levi.doc, (accessed August 17, 2007). 
Lindsay-Poland, John. “U.S. Military Bases in Latin America and the Caribbean." 
in Catherine Lutz, ed., Empire and Global Response, Washington D.C.: 
Pluto Press, 2004. 
Logan, Sam. “U.S. Faces Eviction from Ecuadorian Base." International 
Relations and Security Network, Global Policy Forum, January 12, 2007, 
available from 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/challenges/general/2007/0112ecuador
evict.htm, (accessed December 20, 2007). 
 94
"The McGovern-McCollum-Moore amendment to the foreign operations 
appropriations bill proposed to cut military spending to Colombia by $100 
million." June 28, 2005, available from 
http://www.lawg.org/docs/colombia_debate_6_28_05.pdf, (accessed 
September 12, 2007). 
Mance, Henry. “Colombia’s Conflict and the Lack of a Regional Response: Why 
the United States is Part of the Problem." January 8, 2007, 
http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia250.htm, (accessed January 25, 
2008). 
Manning, Martin J. “Terrorist Organizations, Freezing of Assets." Encyclopedia of 
Espionage, Intelligence, and Security, 2004, available from 
http://www.espionageinfo.com/Te-Uk/Terrorist-Organizations-Freezing-of-
Assets.html, (accessed August 20, 2007). 
Marcella, Gabriel. “The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity 
to Strategic Clarity." Strategic Studies Institute, May 2003, available from 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00007.pdf, (accessed 
January 12, 2008). 
Metz, Steven, and Douglas V Johnson II. Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: 
Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts. Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2001. 
Meza, Ricardo. “Biowarfare in Colombia: A controversial fumigation scheme.” 
NACLA Report on the Americas, 2000. 
Millett, Richard L. “Colombia’s Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider War." 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2002, 
available from 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB14.pdf, 
(accessed November 21, 2007). 
Moghaddam, Fathali. “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration." 
American Psychologist, February-March 2005. 
Murillo, Mario and Jesus Rey Avirama. Colombia and the United States: War, 
Unrest and Destabilization. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003. 
Naim, Moises. “The Five Wars of Globalization." Foreign Policy 134, January - 
February 2003. 
“National Drug Control Strategy." FY 2004 Budget Summary, Office of the 
President of the United States. February 2003, available from 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/budget2002.pdf, 
(accessed August 25, 2007). 
 95
"National Military Strategic Plan 2006 for the War on Terrorism." Donald 
Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 
February 2006. 
“National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002." Office of the President of 
the United States, available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss4.html, (accessed July 20, 2007). 
“National Security Strategy of the United States 2006." Office of the President of 
the United States, available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/, (accessed August 21, 2007). 
NORAD Working Group. The Logical Framework Approach, 4th ed., Norway, 
1999. 
Noriega, Roger F. “U.S. Policy and Programs in Colombia." Testimony before the 
House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Bureau of 
Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, D.C., June 2004, available from 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/040617nori.htm, (accessed August 20, 
2007). 
O’Meara, P., H. Mehlinger and M. Krain. Globalization and The Challenges of a 
New Century: A Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. 
Palast, Greg. “Hugo Chavez in His Own Words." The Progressive, July 26, 2006, 
available from http://www.alternet.org/audits/38549/, (accessed November 
26, 2007). 
Pape, Robert A. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." American Political 
Science Review, August 2003. 
Petras, James. “FARC-EP: The Cost of Unilateral Humanitarian Initiatives, 
Global Research.” March 16, 2008, available from 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8356, (accessed 
March 16, 2008). 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey. Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations. 
Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1994. 
Priest, Dana. “U.S. Military Trains Foreign Troops." Washington Post, July 12, 
1998, A01, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/overseas/overseas, (accessed August 12, 2007). 
"Profile: Hugo Chavez." BBC News. February 11, 2006, available from 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk, (accessed August 20, 2007). 
 96
“Profile of the U.S. Southern Command.” USSOUTHCOM homepage, April 1998 
[database on-line], available from 
http://www.usUSSOUTHCOM.com/USSOUTHCOM/graphics/profile.htm, 
(accessed on 27 May 2007). 
Rabasa, Angel, and Peter Chalk. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs 
and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability. RAND 
Corporation, 2001. 
Rabasa, Angel. et al. Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing 
Terrorism Risks, RAND Corporation, Project Air Force, www.rand.org, 
2007. 
Ribando, Clare. “Ecuador: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations." 
CRS Report for Congress, May 2, 2005, available from 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47776.pdf, (accessed 
November 12, 2007). 
Rivera Velez, Fredy. “Ecuador: Untangling the Drug War.” in Coletta Youngers 
and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of 
U.S. Policy, Washington DC, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. 
Robinson, Linda. Masters of Chaos. New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004. 
Robinson, Linda. “Special Forces in Colombia, South America." U.S. News and 
World Report, 2007. 
Robles, Frances, and Phil Gunson. “Cuba Spotlights Chávez Friendship.” Miami 
Herald, January 26, 2007. 
Rosenberg, Tina. “The Great Cocaine Quagmire: Can Bush Resist Expanding 
Clinton’s Colombian Drug War?" Rolling Stone, 2001. 
Rotberg, Robert. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. 
Brookings Institution Press, February 2003. 
Rougemont, Edward J. Drug Legalization and the Impact of Drugs on 
Hemispheric Security, Inter-American Defense College Department of 
Studies, Class XLII, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., April 2003. 
Saberon De La Cruz, Maria Zosa. U.S. Military Presence In Latin America: 
Making The Manta Forward Operating Location Work. Naval Postgraduate 
School, September 2003. 
Sarkesian, Sam C. America’s Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past 
and Lessons for the Future. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984. 
 97
Sederberg, Peter C. “Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy." Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 3, August 1995. 
Segell, Glen. “The Narcotics War and Civil-Military Relations." International 
Studies Association, March 2000, available from 
http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/seg03/, (accessed October 21, 2007). 
Stavridis, James G. “Statement of Admiral James G. Stavridis." United States 
Southern Command, before the Armed Services Committees, 110th 
Congress, March 2007. 
Suellentrop, Chris. “It's just as fair as CNN." MSN Online, April 2, 2003, available 
from http://slate.msn.com/id/2081057/, (accessed November 20, 2007). 
Sullivan, Mark P. “Latin America: Terrorism Issues." CRS Report for the 
Congress, January 2007, available from 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf, (accessed August 25, 
2007). 
Sullivan, Mark P. and Nelson Olhero. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. 
Policy." CRS Report for Congress, September 4, 2007. 
Sun Tzu. The Art of War, translation by Samuel B. Griffith, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1971, 2-93, cited by Allen W. Batschelet in “Effects-
Based Operations for Joint War Fighters.” U.S. Army Professional Writing 
Collection, May-June 2003, available from 
http://www.army.mil/prof_writing/volumes/volume1/june_2003/6_03_3.html
#8, (accessed February 23, 2008). 
Sweig, Julia E. “What Kind of War for Colombia?" Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 2002, Available From, 
Http://Www.Foreignaffairs.Org/20020901faessay9737/Julia-E-
Sweig/What-Kind-Of-War-For-Colombia.Html, (accessed November 25, 
2007). 
Tillson, John C. F. Learning to Adapt to Asymmetric Threats. Alexandria VA: 
Institute for Defense Analysis, 2005. 
Tostensen, Arne and Beate Bull. “Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?" World Politics 
54, April 2002. 
Trager, Robert F. and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva. “Deterring Terrorism; It Can Be 
Done." International Security 2005-6. 
 98
United Nations Security Council. Agenda Small Arms, 4048th Meeting, New 
York. September 24, 1999, available from 
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/docs/scpv4048e.pdf, (accessed 
November 21, 2007). 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2007. United 
Nations Publication, available from www.unodc.org, 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf, (accessed 
September 16, 2007). 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2007 World Drug Report, United 
Nations Publication, 2007. 
United Nations Environment Programme. “The Environment in the News." 
February 28, 2007, available from 
http://www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/2007Feb28.doc, (accessed January 27, 
2008). 
U.S. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. “International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report," Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, March 2007.  
U.S. State Department. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I, Drug 
and Chemical Control, March 2007. 
U.S. State Department. “Foreign Military Financing 2005-07: U.S., FY 2007." 
International Affairs, Budget Request Summary and Highlights, 
Washington, February 2006, available from 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/2007/, (accessed May 16, 2007). 
U.S. State Department. "Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, 
Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006." Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
September 2006, available from 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74687.htm, (accessed May 
15, 2007. 
U.S. State Department. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations." Office of 
Counterterrorism, Washington D.C., October, 2001, available from 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/5258.htm, (accessed August 23, 
2007).  
U.S. State Department. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 1996-
2005." available from http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/, (accessed 
September 16, 2007). 
 99
U.S. State Department. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 
I, Drug and Chemical Control, March 2007. 
U.S. State Department. “State Department International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Reports 1996-2005.” available from 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/, (accessed August 25, 2007). 
U.S. State Department. “U.S. Assistance for “Plan Colombia.” Military 
Appropriations, Act for FY 2001. 
U.S. State Department. “Western Hemispheric Region, Foreign Military Training: 
Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006." Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, September 2006, available from 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74687.htm, (accessed May 
15, 2007). 
“USSOUTHCOM’s Theater Strategy." USSOUTHCOM homepage, March 5, 
2003 [database on-line]; available from 
http://www.USSOUTHCOM.mil/pa/Facts/Strategy.htm, (accessed October 
20, 2007). 
Vaicius, Ingrid and Adam Isacson. “The 'War on Drugs' meets the 'War on 
Terror.'" Center for International Policy, Colombian Program, February 
2003, available from http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/0302ipr.htm, 
(accessed December 20, 2007). 
Veillette, Connie. “Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding 
Programs: FY2007 Assistance." CRS Report for Congress, August 30, 
2007, available from 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80723.pdf, (accessed 
September 16, 2007). 
Vickers, Michael G. “Implementing GWOT strategy: Overcoming interagency 
problems." United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, and Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities, Testimony online, March 15, 2006, available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2006_h/060315-
vickers.pdf, (accessed May 29, 2007). 
Walters, John P. “Report on Progress in Colombia: Briefing to Foreign Press 
Center.” Office of National Drug Control Policy, November 17, 2005.  
Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). "U.S. Counter-Drug Assistance to 
Latin America: A Program-by-Program Overview.” 32, [database on-line], 
available from 
http://www.wola.org/publications/ddhr_military_overview.pdf, (accessed 
June 4, 2007).  
 100
Weinberg, Bill, "FARC: 'Terrorists' or 'belligerents'?" January 20, 2008, available 
from http://ww4report.com/node/4962, (accessed January 23, 2008). 
Weisbrot, Mark. “Is Hugo Chavez a Threat to Stability?" Center for Economic and 
Policy Research, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2007, available from 
International Affairs Forum, http://ia-forum.org, (accessed April 20, 2007). 
Westenhoff, Charles M. Military Airpower, A Revised Digest of Airpower Opinions 
and Thoughts. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2007, 
available from 
http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Westenhoff%201/Westenhoff%201.pdf, 
(accessed February 25, 2008). 
White, Robert. “El Salvador’s lessons unlearned, heading for trouble in 
Colombia." Center for International Policy, Washington, available from 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD, (accessed August 18, 2007). 
Wilhelm, Charles E. “The Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and 
Terrorism.” Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Subcommittee, June 22, 1999, available from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/000215-col-usa-usia4.htm, 
(accessed October 15, 2007). 
Williams, Colin and Celso Andrade. “Plan Colombia: U.S. Trust and Influence in 
the Andean Ridge." Naval Postgraduate School, September 12, 2007. 
World Report. “Colombia: Defending Human Rights and the Role of the 
International Community.” 2002, available from 
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/americas4.html, (accessed February 12, 2008). 
Zibechi, Raúl. “Chile and Venezuela: Myths and Realities of the Arms Race." 
Center for International Policy, Americas Program, August 5, 2007, 
available from http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/2886.cfm, (accessed 
January 15, 2008). 
 101
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. USSOUTHCOM,  
Miami, Florida 
 
4. USSOCOM,  
Tampa, Florida 
 
5. Ministry of Defense  
Quito, Ecuador 
 
6. Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas 
Quito, Ecuador 
 
7. Fuerza Terrestre del Ecuador 
Quito, Ecuador 
